Barriers to entry in a regulated industry: Tackling barriers to entry with limited resources - The entrant perspective by Asikainen, Karla
Barriers to Entry in a Regulated Industry: Tackling
Barriers to Entry with Limited Resources - The Entrant
Perspective
Marketing
Master's thesis
Karla Asikainen
2012
Department of Marketing
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
 
 
Author  Karla Asikainen 
Title of thesis  Barriers to Entry in a Regulated Industry: Tackling Barriers to Entry with Limited 
Resources – The Entrant Perspective 
Degree  Master of Science 
Degree programme  Marketing 
Thesis advisor(s)  Petri Parvinen and Mika Skippari 
Year of approval  2012 Number of pages  133 Language  English 
Abstract 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
Earlier research on barriers to entry has strongly focused on the incumbents and explored 
strategies through which the incumbents are able to create or strengthen barriers to entry to deter 
entry from new competition to the industry. The objective of this research is to take the entrant 
perspective and study the implications of the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant seeking to 
enter a highly regulated marketplace. More specifically, the aim is to introduce the barriers to 
entry for a new entrant in the contextual background of market regulation and study how the 
entrant can tackle these barriers to entry to gain success in market entry. In addition, implications 
of high barriers to entry in relation to support for new company birth and growth are discussed.   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is built on a case study design, focusing on a Finnish small company seeking to enter the 
highly regulated medical device market with an innovative product offering. The data was 
collected in interviews with case company key personnel and Finnish innovation support system 
actors.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Based on the case study findings, the earlier research has presented barriers to entry misleadingly 
as static obstacles in market entry from a small entrant perspective, and implicating little to no 
chance for the entrants to tackle the barriers to entry. The present study challenges the notion of 
barriers to entry as static obstacles and through the case study findings portraits the entrant’s 
market entry efforts as a dynamic play in which the entrants can formulate strategies to gain entry 
in the same manner as the incumbents can formulate strategies to deter entry from new 
competition.  In addition, the earlier research on barriers to entry has failed to appreciate the 
socio-economic implications of high barriers to entry for new company birth and growth. The case 
study findings support the implications that high regulation leads to severe barriers to entry and 
easily leads to consolidated market structures. This finding implies that especially in industries 
with wider social and economic welfare implications, the government should seek to lower the 
barriers to entry in these industries to contribute to improved net welfare 
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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the background for the study, identifies the research 
gap for the study, and presents the research questions and objectives for the 
study. In addition, the scope of the study is defined. The chapter ends in the 
outlining of the structure for the study.  
 
1.1. Background 
The birth and growth of new companies is the prerequisite for 
entrepreneurship (Hitt et al. 1999) – a force that has been the seed of much 
of wealth creation during the past decades (Birch 1987; Kirchhoff 1991), 
responsible for the unforeseen rise in the quality of life of people in the 
Western world (Robinson & McDougall 2001). With regards to the current 
economic crisis and the threat it places for the sustainability of the current 
standards of living and social welfare, it has become even more important to 
create new ventures that will not only affect to job creation but can also 
serve as drivers of competitive advantage for countries and different areas.  
This study focuses on the market entry of de novo ventures defined as 
companies new to the industry that are marketed and operated 
independently from incumbents and are not reliant on resources from 
incumbents (Helfat and Lieberman 2002). Thus the study focuses on new 
start-ups that are not owned by a parent nor linked to an incumbent.  The 
interest of the study is on the barriers to entry these new entrants face whilst 
seeking to enter a highly regulated market with an innovative offering. Prior 
research has shown that only a small fraction of new ventures survive 
beyond the first years of their operation, with approximately 40 percent 
failing during the first year of operations (Timmons 1990), over 50 percent 
2 
 
within the first four years (Phillips & Kirchhoff 1989), with only less than 
half making it past the fifth anniversary (Dunne et al. 1989). These studies 
have included samples from various industries in different lifecycles and 
with different market entry strategies. The findings unanimously have 
shown that even though small-scale de novo entry of new ventures is fairly 
common in most industries, their survival odds independent of the industry 
are generally very low (Geroski 1991, 436). Cabral and Mata (2003) have 
argued that a combination of financial constraints and market selection 
forces are some of the most defining factors in the short life expectancy of 
these new ventures in most industries - both found to be major factors in 
deterring market entry in the corresponding research on the conditions for 
market entry and the barriers to entry in an industry (e.g. Bain 1956; Stigler 
1968; Porter 1980; Porter 1985). This argument has also been supported by 
other authors, noting that the low survival rates of new ventures may well be 
linked to the more severe barriers to entry that they will face (Hines 1957; 
Gorecki 1975; Yip 1982, Hariharan & Brush 1999). Earlier research has 
also constantly shown a link between high barriers to entry and a low rate of 
innovation, mostly hampered by the high consolidation and low entry rates 
in highly regulated industries (Friedman & Taylor 2011). Prior research has 
also suggested that high entry barriers have a strong influence on the 
industry performance, reducing productivity, employment and increasing 
labor costs (Schivardi & Viviano 2010), decreasing R&D efficiency, 
hampering innovation and leading to suboptimal allocation of resources 
(Aghion & al. 2009; Cullman & al. 2012).  
Over the course of decades of research on barriers to market entry, the view 
on what constitutes a barrier to entry has varied depending on the research 
stream and the researcher. Lately, barriers to entry have been defined as 
factors that limit competition by preventing market entry of new firms and in 
the process often leading to an increase in the profits of the established 
incumbents in the marketplace (Karakaya 2002). Earlier research is 
unanimous concerning a link between regulation and high barriers to entry, 
constantly showing that a higher degree of governmental regulation deters 
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entry from new competition and leads to decreased economic and social 
welfare (e.g. Shaffer 1995; Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Lutz & al. 2010; 
Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 2012) 
A majority of earlier research on barriers to entry has taken the point of 
view of the incumbents, the established companies already in the industry 
(Robinson & McDougall 2001; Pehrsson 2009), and on the possibilities for 
these companies to use the barriers to entry as their benefit to mitigate the 
threat of new entrants (Porter 1979; 2008; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). 
Thus the entrant perspective has largely been ignored. There is also a lack of 
research on the different industry characteristics and structures in relation to 
the types of barriers to entry that exist to new entrants in a given industry. In 
addition, even though strong theoretical linkages between high levels of 
industry regulation and high barriers to entry exists, empirical evidence on 
the effects of entry barriers in highly regulated industries is missing (Lutz & 
al. 2010). Prior theory has suggested that the importance of specific entry 
barriers on new company survival and performance is dependent on the 
industry life cycle and the entry strategy of the new venture (e.g. Bain 1959; 
Stigler 1968; Hofer 1975; Porter 1980; Hay & Morris 1991; Robinson & 
McDougall 2001; Pehrsson 2009), and also varies by products and 
industries (Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Yang 1998; Karakaya 2002; Pehrsson 
2009). It has also been argued that the structural elements of an industry 
have different effect on a wide range of performance measures for a new 
venture entering a market (Robinson & McDougall 1998; Robinson 1999; 
Lutz & al. 2010 ). In addition, the timing of entry (Robinson & Fornell 
1985; Kerin et al. 1992; Pehrsson 2009) and the size of the entrant can have 
an effect on the height of the barriers for a new entrant (Blees & al. 2003).  
With only scant prior empirical evidence on barriers to entry in a specific 
industry setting of high regulation, there is a need for further research on the 
barriers to entry for a new entrant taking into account the structural 
characteristics, the type of market and the industry life cycle – and also the 
characteristics of the new venture entering the market. The effects of 
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barriers to entry become drastically emphasized for small entrants who 
usually have less or no prior experience of the market and suffer from lack 
of financial capital. The aim of this study is to add to the current literature 
by focusing on the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant in the context of a 
highly consolidated and regulated health care industry. The health care 
industry was chosen as a prime example of an industry with a highly 
consolidated market governed by a handful of strong existing incumbents 
with profit margins unfamiliar to almost any other market. In addition to the 
strong existing incumbents in the market earning above-normal profits, the 
industry also has a second singular characteristic, making it a very 
interesting setting for examination of barriers to entry in a contextual setting 
– a high level of regulation from different governmental authorities. An 
examination of the barriers to entry from the point of view of the de novo 
market entrant in the context of a highly regulated industry and specifically 
its means to tackle these barriers offers an interesting addition to the 
existing literature on the barriers to market entry.  
The health care industry as a setting for the study is very topical also from 
the perspective of social welfare and public sector financial struggles 
globally. As welfare costs are taking up an increasing portion of countries’ 
GDP (Hermans & al. 2009, 19), public sectors globally are facing a 
balancing act in accommodating its objectives of decreasing the costs of 
health care and at the same time increasing the quality of health care and the 
technologies used in health care management (Hermans & al. 2009, 
Preface). With the global health care megatrends - an ageing population, the 
explosion of new therapeutic technologies, and a critical shortage of clinical 
professionals – there is a portentous need for new technology and new 
solutions to more efficiently solve these problems facing most health care 
systems and government budgets currently. Schumpeter (1939, 7) wrote 
already in the late 30’s that the industry changing innovations come almost 
without exception from new companies, with the incumbents rather 
focusing on finding new ways to raise the barriers to entry for new 
innovations than developing them themselves, a notion that still has its 
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validity today (e.g. Friedman & Taylor 2011). As the role of new companies 
as key drivers for economic growth and job creation, European level 
governmental initiatives have been started aiming for new support 
mechanisms for new venture companies (e.g. Edler & Georghiou 2007).  
The previous literature on barriers to entry has shown the important role of 
government legislation on the height of the entry barriers and the success of 
new ventures in entering a market. This study further investigates the 
potential to influence the barriers to entry from the point of view of the 
entrant and also the government in aiding innovation diffusion in health care 
leading to improved social welfare consequences (e.g. Bertrand & Kramarz 
2002; Hermans & al. 2009). The phenomenon is studied from the point of 
view of the entrant and its relations to the incumbents and governmental or 
authority bodies, disregarding the potential linkages between these actors 
non-related to the entrant.  
The methodology used in this study includes a literature review and a single 
case study. First, the prior research on barriers to entry is reviewed in an 
extensive but by no means exhaustive literature review on prior research on 
barriers to entry, 42 barriers are identified and grouped based on the source 
of the barrier for the new entrant. In addition, the potential to influence these 
barriers for the entrant and for government actors is discussed. Secondly, the 
effect of regulation and consolidation on the industry characteristics is 
reviewed. As a second part of this study, a case study method is used to 
complement and add to the current theory by comparing the findings of the 
literature study to practice and seeking to add knowledge on the effects of 
entry barriers for a new entrant in a highly regulated industry and the 
entrant’s potential to influence the barriers to gain entry. The primary data 
collection method in the case study is interviews with case company key 
personnel, industry experts and the Finnish innovation policy actors.  
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1.2. Objectives of the Study and Research 
Questions 
The main objective of the study derives from the identified research 
questions. The objective can be summarized as follows: 
To add to the existing knowledge on the barriers to entry from the 
perspective of a de novo entrant in a specific industry setting defined by 
high regulation; to discuss the effect of regulation and high entry barriers 
on the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant and to identify what 
potential does the entrant have in tackling these barriers to entry.  
The main objective is achieved by combining the previous academic 
literature with empirical findings of the case study to produce new 
understanding of the conditions for market entry for new companies 
entering highly regulated markets. For companies the main objective of the 
study is to deepen the understanding of the relevant barriers to entry in a 
highly regulated industry, and to study whether the entrants will have the 
means to tackle the identified barriers to entry in the specific industry. The 
broader objective is to produce practical knowledge from the prior research 
and especially the empirical reality of the case study company in relation to 
the initiatives to foster new company growth which is much dependent on 
the conditions for market entry and post-entry success. The specific setting 
of a highly regulated industry is a novel context for research on barriers to 
entry that requires further research, especially from the entrant perspective. 
The main research question:  
What are the barriers to entry for a small-scale de novo entrant entering 
a highly regulated market and how can the new entrant influence these 
barriers with limited resources to gain entry? 
The main research question is examined by comparing the theories from the 
literature review to the specific industry setting and company experiences in 
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the case study. To support this aim, the main research question is broken 
down into four additional sub-research questions.  
Sub-research questions: 
RQ1: According to previous theory, what are the barriers to entry for a de 
novo entrant in a highly regulated industry? 
RQ2: According to previous theory, how can a de novo entrant tackle these 
barriers to entry? 
RQ3: What are the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant in a highly 
regulated industry based on the empirical findings? 
RQ4: How can a small-scale de novo entrant tackle the barriers to entry with 
limited resources based on empirical findings? 
 
1.3. Scope and limitations of the study 
This study focuses on the market entry for a small de novo venture company 
and more specifically on the barriers to entry the company faces in entering 
a highly regulated market. For the purpose of adding new knowledge in 
respect to the identified main research question, a highly regulated industry 
serves as a model example of examining the effects of high barriers to entry 
for a small de novo company as the industry is very consolidated with only a 
few strong incumbents earning above-normal profits and aggressively 
protecting their market positions.  
The case study focuses on a Finnish start-up company seeking to enter the 
health care market with an innovative new product for diabetes 
management. The particularity of the case study poses limitations to the 
generalizability of the results to other industries and applications. As a part 
of the objective of this study is to show the influence of the specific industry 
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and market characteristics on the barriers to entry, the specific nature of the 
case study serves the purpose of gaining a deeper understanding of barriers 
to entry in the specific highly regulated industry. It is also possible that 
some of the implications of the case study are applicable to other industries 
with similar industry and market characteristics. On the other hand, the 
theoretical section provides a needed review to the existing literature on 
barriers to entry from different research streams that are of beneficial nature 
also to other industries and settings. In addition, at least some of the case 
study implications have general application to the study on the barriers to 
entry and the effect of different industry settings to the height, importance, 
and influencability of the barriers.    
Geographically, the study focuses on the European health care industry and 
more specifically on the European blood glucose monitoring industry. Even 
though the geographical distances are relatively small, there is a variety of 
different cultural and praxis settings in the focus area. Due to the nature of 
this study, the strong focus on the experiences of the entrant company in 
question, and on the general notion of Europe as a single market area within 
the industry, the between-country variances are not considered a limitation 
for this study. In addition, even though the characteristics of markets outside 
Europe may be different, the same industry incumbents control the market 
globally making at least some of the findings generalizable outside the 
European markets.  
Thus, the scope of the study focuses on the barriers to entry that a single de 
novo venture company entering into a highly regulated and deeply 
consolidated industry faces and what are its chances of tackling these 
barriers to gain entry. In addition, the implications of government influence 
on the height of the barriers to entry are studied. The study strongly takes 
the view of the entrant.  
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Figure 1: Scope of the Study and Actors Involved. 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consist of four parts: Part I – Introduction, Part II – Theoretical 
Background, Part III – Empirical Case Study, and Part IV – Discussion and 
Conclusion.  
Part I – Introduction  
Part II – Theoretical Background presents the key theoretical discussions on 
Barriers to Entry and the roles of different actors (entrants, incumbents and 
governments) in raising and tackling those barriers to entry. The context for 
the study is defined. This part answers the first and the second research 
questions.   
Part III – Empirical Case Study is structured in a similar manner as the 
theoretical part, first defining the main barriers to entry for the company and 
then discussing the means for the company to influence i.e. tackle these 
barriers. III thus answers the third and the fourth research question. 
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Part IV – Discussion and Conclusion is used to evaluate the findings of the 
theoretical and empirical parts of the study. Theoretical contribution and 
empirical contributions are evaluated and discussed. In addition, further 
research implications are presented.  
The main research question is discussed throughout the study first from a 
theoretical perspective and then with empirical findings. The main research 
question is thus linked to all parts of the study and is answered through the 
four sub-research questions. In part IV, the findings are discussed and 
summarized to answer the main research question.  
 
 
Figure 2 Structure of the Thesis 
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PART II – THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this part of the thesis the previous literature on barriers to market entry 
and the regulation of the market is reviewed. The focus is on identifying the 
barriers to entry for a new entrant based on prior research and to study 
theoretical implications of regulation in a market.  
 
2. Market Entry and Barriers to Entry 
In this section of the thesis the different forms of market entry are 
introduced and certain implications for post-entry success relating to the 
timing and scale of the entry are discussed.  
Furthermore, the prior research on barriers to entry is reviewed and 42 
barriers to entry for a de novo entrant are identified and categorized. Lastly, 
the potential to influence the barriers is discussed from the point of view of 
the incumbents, entrants and governments.  
2.1. Market entry 
The previous literature has identified different forms of entry. This study 
focuses on an entry by a de novo entrant to an industry in which it has no 
previous experience in. It is still beneficial to recognize the other potential 
forms of entry. The literature recognizes four different forms of entry 
(Geroski 1991): 
1. De novo entry (also referred to as green-field or start-up entry) by a 
new company to a new industry 
2. Existing company entering a new industry by building new capacity  
3. Existing company entering a new industry by acquiring existing 
capacity 
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4. Existing company entering a new product market  
Another potential way to look at the different types of market entry is to 
focus on whether the entrant is large or small. Even though both would be 
considered as new entrants to an industry, the conditions to entry are very 
different for the two, in a large part relating to the existing capabilities 
(Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998). Blees and al. (2003) have concluded that 
large entrants, usually entering through diversifying from another industry, 
will have existing experience, existing and well-established relationships 
with suppliers and customers, have access to distribution networks and 
usually have access to great amounts of financial capital. On the other hand, 
small entrants usually have less or no prior experience and suffer from a 
lack of financial capital.  
Earlier research has also focused on identifying the most advantageous point 
of entry for companies. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) introduced the 
concept of a first mover advantage which suggests that the first companies 
to market are able to obtain better profit margins, are able to negotiate lower 
costs of capital and can reach a head start over its rivals, placing them into 
an advantageous competitive position in relation to the later entrants. Much 
research has identified specific advantages for early entrants over later 
entrants (e.g. Robinson and Fornell 1985; Kerin et al. 1992; Frynas & al. 
2006; Pehrsson 2009). Some studies have additionally shown explicit 
effects such as higher market shares of first movers than their followers (e.g. 
Kerin et al. 1992) thus advocating for an early entry into an industry. 
The implications for de novo, small entrants have been that the industry life 
cycle and the timing of entry have more significant effects on the post-entry 
performance for small companies than large ones (Robinson & McDougall 
2001). Research findings also suggest that especially in industries where the 
barriers to entry are high, a new company should enter in the very early 
stages of the industry life cycle as the effect of entry barriers on the early 
performance of the entrant is moderated when compared to entering at later 
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stages (e.g. Peltzman 1977; Porter 1980; Perhrsson 2009) – a finding that 
has even more emphasis in industries where economies of scale and capital 
requirements are large (Robinson & McDougall 2001).  
Thus, the previous research would suggest that some entry barriers are much 
higher for small entrants compared to larger entrants with an even larger 
effect in case the small entrant is a de novo entrant with no existing 
capabilities or financial capital (Blees & al. 2003). The large, already 
existing companies can use their existing infrastructure and brand name 
when entering a new industry or a market. In addition to benefitting from 
existing capabilities and assets, the larger companies usually have much 
more financial leverage and are usually better in attracting new capital 
financing to support their entry (Robinson & McDougall 2001; Hochberg & 
al. 2010). Furthermore, they usually are large enough to influence the 
competitive positions in an industry (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; 
Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). Larger entrants will often have synergies 
with existing operations and are able to gain economies of scale and scope 
much earlier than the smaller entrants. As discussed in the following 
chapters, a successful entry usually requires significant capital to be able to 
meet the incumbents’ market power and to be able to tackle the barriers to 
entry (e.g. Blees & al. 2003; Porter 2008; Pehrsson 2009). In many ways, 
small entrants are often first and most directly affected by the actions of the 
incumbents such as different types of retaliatory actions (Golodner 2001). 
Then again, small companies might be able to escape some of the more 
direct attacks as they might be seen as less of a threat than large scale 
entrants (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; Fan 2010). Still, post-entry 
performance has been positively associated with the scale of entry (Sharma 
1998). More aggressive strategies have been associated with longer-term 
performance (Biggadike 1979) and the chance of moving down the learning 
and experience curve more quickly with broader scope (Robinson & 
McDougall 2001; Pehrsson 2009). 
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2.2. Barriers to Entry 
 According to current theoretical knowledge, barriers to entry are defined as 
factors that limit competition by preventing market entry of new companies 
(Karakaya 2002). These barriers can be either structural or strategic; the 
industrial organization research tradition has strongly focused on the 
structural barriers stemming from the characteristics of industry structure 
whereas the strategic barriers are discussed in the strategic management 
stream as a resource for creating competitive advantage for the incumbents 
in the market place (Lutz & al. 2010). The two research streams are strongly 
complementary rather than contradictive.  
The industrial organization view (Bain 1956; Stigler 1968) takes the 
industry as the unit of analysis and focuses on the structural characteristics 
of an industry and the industry actors’ reactions to these characteristics. 
Bain (1956) focused his attention to the characteristics of the market that 
deter entry from new competition and allow the incumbents to earn above-
normal profits without inducing entry. Stigler (1968) later expanded Bain’s 
view by adding the interest in the post-entry conditions and focused on the 
efficiency of the incumbents vs. later entrants by defining a barrier to entry 
as a differential cost that needs to be borne by later entrants. Geroski et al. 
(1990) also later added considerations for behavior as a determinant for 
market performance and market structure, thus emphasizing that the 
incumbent strategies can affect the structural characteristics of an industry 
in the long term.  
The structural barriers in an industry can be any structural aspect that allows 
for the incumbents to raise their prices above the minimum average cost of 
the potential entrants, thus hampering the potential entry and decreasing 
competition (Han & al. 2001). These structural factors can include aspects 
such as economies of scale, level of technology, absolute cost advantages or 
governmental regulations present in an industry (Bain 1956; Stigler 1968).  
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There are many industries where the barriers to entry are high due to the 
structural characteristics of the industry such as in some oligopolies that 
have a high marketing intensity (e.g. cigarette industry), or high 
technological barriers due to patents (e.g. health care industry) (Blees & al. 
2003). These industry structures are likely to serve the incumbents in an 
industry, creating barriers to entry for new competition.  
The strategic management view (Porter 1980; 1985) focuses on individual 
companies as the unit of analysis, and their strategies on reaching to 
improve their performance and to find an advantageous competitive position 
in relation to others actors such as new entrants. In this view, the actors are 
proactive and through their strategies can build strategic barriers to entry 
and affect their competitive environment. Incumbent companies will seek to 
formulate such strategies that will allow is to outstand the competition from 
superior performance. This superior value creation ability is referred to as 
competitive advantage and is strongly linked to the company resources 
(Barney 1991). According to the strategic management view, the 
incumbents can use their superior resources as an advantage and create 
severe entry barriers to deter entry from new competition (Wernerfelt 1984, 
Peteraf and Bergen 2003, Ketchen et al. 2007). Thus the strategic barriers 
are a result from the incumbents’ behavior and entry-deterring strategies 
(Lutz & al. 2010). These strategies might include retaliatory actions by 
incumbents or other direct attacks towards the new entrants, affecting both 
the entry decision and post-entry performance of the entrants.   
In industries where the incumbents have strong market power and great 
accumulated resources, they are more likely to be able to gain sustainable 
competitive advantages through strategies exploiting their superior resource-
base, that can only slowly and costly be matched by the entrants, to deter 
entry from new entrants and also to create barriers for growth for other 
incumbents (e.g. Grant 1991; Blees & al. 2003).  
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The two streams combined suggest that economies of scale, capital 
requirements and product differentiation would be the most important 
barriers to entry (e.g. Bain 1956; Hofer 1975; Porter 1980; Hay & Morris 
1991; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). Robinson and McDougall (2001) 
have further emphasized in their research that product differentiation is the 
key barrier in terms of post-entry success measured by profitability.  
 
2.2.1. Types of barriers to entry 
A review into previous literature on barriers to entry from both theoretical 
streams led to the identification of 42 different types of barriers to entry. 
Even though many identified barriers have a relation to other types of 
identified barriers, these 42 barriers have been clearly distinct in previous 
research. Many identified barriers can be considered both structural 
according to the industrial organization view but also strategic in terms of 
incumbent influence on the height of the barrier. This would support the 
complementarity of the two views on barriers to entry. The identified 
barriers are listed in the following table giving a description to a barrier, 
with a brief description and studied literature sources.
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Table 1 Barriers to Entry 
Barrier to Entry Description of the Barrier Literature source 
Absolute cost advantage Entrants' average costs of producing are higher than the incumbents'  
average costs discouraging entry. 
Bain 1956; Salop & Scheffman 1983; Shepherd 
1997; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; Karakaya 
2002 
Access and control over 
strategic resources 
Control over strategic resources implies that incumbents can hold the 
necessary resources from potential entrants, preventing them from 
entering the market. 
Grant 1991; Shepherd 1997; Gaynor & Haas-
Wilson 1998; Blees & al. 2003; Karakaya 2002;  
Access to distribution channels Incumbents can block access to distribution channels for the entrant, 
leaving them with inferior sales channels. 
Porter 1980; Porter 1985; Robertson & Gatignon 
1991; Karakaya 2002 
Asset specificity Because specific assets cannot be sold and converted, these assets 
impose high losses if the entry fails. 
Williamson 1996; Shepherd 1997 
Availability of skilled labor Shortage of skilled labor leads to shortage in human capital which is 
necessary to run the operations. 
Gerlach & Wagner 1994; Arend 2001; Blees & 
al. 2003 
Brand  Buyer inertia may lead to a sort of monopoly situation instead of 
competition, forcing entrants to spend heavily to overcome the 
incumbents' strong brand.   
Krouse 1984; Netter 1984; Gaynor & Haas-
Wilson 1998; Karakaya 2002; Blees & al. 2003; 
Pehrsson 2009 
Bundling Bundling products or services together, makes it harder for an entrant 
with only one of these goods to enter the market. 
Nalebuff 2004 
Capital intensity of the market /   
Investment risk 
Due to the perceived risk of financiers, the imcumbents will find it easier 
and cheaper to collect financing when needed than it is for the entrants.  
Dixit 1980; Porter 1980; Demsetz 1982; 
Veendorp 1991; Kleiweg & Lever 1996; 
Karakaya 2002 
Capital requirements  The need to invest large financial resources in order to enter a certain 
market - the barrier is especially high in capital intensive industries. 
Bain 1956; Eaton & Lipsey 1980; Porter 1980; 
Harrigan  1981; Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Kleiweg 
& Lever 1996;  Shepherd 1997; Matthyssens & 
al. 1998; Karakaya 2002 
Causal ambiguity Causal ambiguity can prevent potential entrants from learning from 
incumbents and the market because it makes it hard to understand the 
link between resources and competitive advantage. 
Reed & Defillippi 1990; Mosakowski 1997; 
McEvily & al. 2000; Alvarez & Busenitz 2001; 
King & Zeithaml 2001 
Costs of operating in foreign 
markets 
Transaction costs posed to the entrant when entering a foreign market 
compared to domestic incumbents. 
Barkema & al. 1996 
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Cultural distance High transaction costs for foreign entrants due to different attitudes, 
preferences and ways of doing things. 
Madsen 1994; Blees & al. 2003 
Customer loyalty  Strong customer loyalty for incumbents' brands can create an 
asymmetry of costs between the incumbents and the entrants. 
Customer loyalty can also be communicated by incumbents to scare off 
potential entrants.  
Robertson & Gatignon 1991; de Ruyter & al. 
1998; Karakaya 2002; Blees & al. 2003; 
Pehrsson 2009 
Customer switching costs Incumbents have a degree of monopoly power over their repeat 
purchasers due to high switching costs - entrants would have to invest 
heavily to overcome such a barrier. 
Farrell & Shapiro 1988; Klemperer 1992;  
Shepherd 1997; Karakaya 2002; Lutz & al. 2010 
Divisionalization Incumbents with several brands have synergies over costs of managing 
these brands in an asymmetry with new entrants with only one product 
line. Incumbents can also benefit from sharing of the company brand 
between divisions. 
Schwartz & Thompson 1986; Veendorp 1991 
Dynamic limit-pricing The price can be set to the average cost of the most efficient potential 
entrant i.e. the limit-price that will deter entry by making the market 
unprofitable for entrants. 
Bain 1956; Gaskins 1971 
Economies of scale The decline of production and distribution costs per unit of output leads 
to asymmetries of costs. Incumbents can also drive the prices below 
profitable levels for entrants by increasing supply. 
Bain 1956; Modigliani 1958; Stigler 1968; 
Karakaya 2002 
Excess capacity Structural forms of plant under-utilisation as a result of cyclical demand 
or economies of scale will induce over-supply to the market and drive 
the prices down, making it an unattractive market for entrants. 
Spence 1977; Harrigan 1983; Lieberman 1987 
Exclusive deals with customers Customer lock-in to a single supplier - Time-factor essential as in 
whether the deals will delay the sales potential. 
Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998 
Expected retaliation by 
incumbents 
Both gathering adequate reactions to possible entrants and 
communicating credibly about expected retaliatory actions can keep 
entrants away from the market.  
Robertson & Gatignon 1991; Gatignon & al. 
1997; Clark & Montgomery 1998;  Gaynor & 
Haas-Wilson 1998; Prabhu & Stewart 2001; 
Karakaya 2002 
Gaps and asymmetry of 
information /                 Trade 
secrets held by incumbents 
Entrant firms will not have all the industry knowledge at their use and 
might make incorrect decisions on their entry strategies based on that 
incomplete information (e.g. costs of entry). 
Schmalensee 1982; Milgrom & Roberts 1987; 
Clark & Montgomery 1998; Prabhu & Stewart 
2001; Karakaya 2002 
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Government licensing 
requirements 
Transaction costs often build up to significant sums due to 
administrative burdens and internal and external bureaucracy barriers 
increasing costs of entry and delaying entry.  
Hall 1992; Karakaya 2002; Blees & al. 2003 
Government policies Restrictive government policies can increase economies of scale, 
capital requirements and other potential barriers and favor the 
incumbents in relation to the entrants or even deter entry.  
Porter 1980; Porter 1985; OECD 1994 
Government subsidies Subsidies to incumbents who could finance from their cash flow will 
increase the cost asymmetry between the incumbents and the entrants.  
Karakaya 2002 
High profit rates earned by 
incumbents 
Incumbents will be very defensive over their above-normal profit 
margins.  
Karakaya 2002 
High wages for employees and 
managers 
Incumbents can increase the industry wage rate, making entry very 
costly for entrants due to the relative labor-intensity of their operations 
and their lack of economies of scale. 
Williamson 1968; Gollier 1991 
Incumbent learning curves, 
experience, org. capabilities, 
know-how 
The accumulation of tacit knowledge into the incumbent organization 
through time can be an important source of sustainable competitive 
advantage for incumbents through efficiency gains. 
Spence 1981; Devinney 1987; Lieberman 1987; 
Hall 1992; Madhok 1996; Chi & Roehl 1997; 
Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; Karakaya 2002; 
Lutz & al. 2010 
Incumbents with proprietary 
technology / level of technology 
The technological lead gives an advantage to incumbents as the 
entrants require large investments to reach the same level of 
technology advancement. 
Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Karakaya 2002 
Location Location is an important determinant that can lead to structural cost 
disadvantages in relation to the incumbents if the entrants need to 
settle for a less than suitable location concerning the industry, or a 
more costly one. 
Van Noort & Reijmer 1999 
Marketing intensity Marketing costs are sunk costs, and effective marketing requires a 
large minimum scale. High prevailing levels of marketing create 
additional cost for entrants that are fixed for each level of outputs - 
Large incumbents will have scale economies over small entrants, and 
thus their marketing cost per product sold will be lower than the cost 
per product of the entrant. Marketing can result in imperfect consumer 
information The need for entrants to spend heavily to countervail this 
unbalanced supply of information. 
Harrigan 1983; Schmalensee 1983; Karakaya & 
Stahl 1989; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; 
Karakaya 2002 
Packing the product space / 
product scope 
With a wide selection of varieties to customers, the entry is less 
attractive for new entrants with new differentiated products. 
Giraud-Héraud & al. 2003; Pehrsson 2009 
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Patents Gives the owner a certain degree of market power for a limited period 
of time, limiting entry during that period. 
Harrigan 1983; Shepherd 1997; Gaynor & Haas-
Wilson 1998; Lutz & al. 2010; Duchene & Serfes 
2012 
Political resources/relations Policy setting will favor incumbents, leaving entrants even more 
vulnerable. 
Frynas & al. 2006 
Product differentiation A differentiated offering from an incumbent can deter entry by entrants 
through brand loyalty and high need to spend heavily. In addition, the 
incumbents can raise the prices to the limit price without losing 
customers. 
Bain 1956; Schmalensee 1982; Karakaya & 
Stahl 1989; Shepherd 1997; Matthyssens & al. 
1998; Pehrsson 2009 
Rate of technological change Too rapid technological change in an industry can make the industry 
unattractive to entrants concerning new investments and earning those 
back. Too slow rate would suggest slow uptake of new technologies 
making entry unattractive for entrants with innovative offerings. 
Harrigan 1981 
R&D expense involved in 
entering / R&D intensity 
Continuous investments into R&D can create a strong barrier to entry 
for the incumbents. 
Harrigan 1981; Karakaya 2002 
Seller concentration In a highly concentrated industry, the incumbents will have more power 
to adjust the market pricing and impose limit-pricing and other actions 
on entrants. 
Bain 1956; Modigliani 1958; Mann 1966; 
Karakaya 2002 
Selling expenses involved in 
marketing 
High selling expenditures by incumbents may increase customer loyalty 
and increase customer-switching costs thus making entry less 
attractive for entrants. In case of entry, makes it very costly for entrants 
to compete. 
Gatignon & al. 1997; Karakaya 2002 
Special risk and uncertainties of 
entry 
Considerably higher business and financial risk for entrants compared 
to incumbents raises both operational and transactional costs for the 
entrant. 
Shepherd 1997; Hochberg & al. 2010 
Sunk costs  Costs that cannot be recuperated but are needed to enter the market 
can be a significant barrier to entry, especially if the needed investment 
is significant. 
Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; Karakaya 2002 
Transaction costs  High costs involved in market exchanges especially if there are many 
stakeholders. 
Williamson & Ghani 2012 
Vertical integration If there is vertical integration present in the industry, to match up to the 
incumbents, the entrant needs to make more investments and a larger 
commitment. 
Williamson 1996; Shepherd 1997 
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Karakaya (2002) suggested grouping of different types of barriers to entry, 
identified in the previous work by Karakaya and Stahl (1989), in his 
research on the importance of the barriers to entry for executives from a 
wide range of industrial firms. Based on the results of a factor analysis, four 
underlying dimensions were chosen as the grouping factors; Firm specific 
advantages, Product differentiation, Financial requirements of cost of 
market entry, and Profit expectation of entering firms. Using Karakaya’s 
factors as the basis for grouping but taking into account the 17 additional 
barriers to entry that have been identified in this literature review, five 
categories are suggested for the 42 identified barriers to entry.  
1. Company specific advantages – Specific advantages of the 
incumbents in the market that cannot be easily achieved or 
duplicated by entrants 
2. Customer/market-based advantages – Advantages of the 
incumbents deriving from product differentiation, brand and 
customer loyalty 
3. Financial requirements or cost of market entry – Barriers rising 
from the high capital requirements 
4. Profit expectation of entrants – The potential post-entry 
profitability of the entrants affecting the entry decision 
5. Industry characteristics – The barriers rising from the industry 
structures and from the conduct of the actors in the environment  
The company specific advantages are very hard to overcome for the entering 
company. The results of Karakaya’s (2002) study imply that the executives 
studied considered the company specific advantages to include the most 
significant barriers to entry. Customer/market-based advantages make 
entering difficult as customers are loyal to an incumbent and are generally 
unwilling to switch to a new product – especially in industries where the 
risk associated with purchase is high and transaction costs for the search of a 
new supplier are high. Financial requirements are linked to the costs of entry 
but also to the size of the investments required by the entrant to be able to 
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compete in the market.  The profit expectations of the entrants can influence 
the entry decision significantly. There are also two sides to the 
attractiveness of the industry, on one hand the high profit margins are 
encouraging entry but on the other the incumbent companies are more likely 
to be very defensive towards new entrants in market with high profitability.  
The importance of the barriers to entry also depends on the characteristics of 
the industry, including the industry structure and the conduct of industry 
actors. For instance, some barriers to entry are different in industrial markets 
compared to consumer markets, a factor very much related to the industry 
characteristics (Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Karakaya 2002).  
Following categories have been built from the identified barriers to entry 
basing on and augmenting the categorization suggested by Karakaya (2002), 
taking the view of the entrant: 
Company specific advantages – Absolute cost advantage; Access and 
control over strategic resources; Causal ambiguity; Divisionalization; 
Economies of scale; Exclusive deals with customers; Gaps and asymmetry 
of information/Trade secrets held by incumbents; Government subsidies; 
Incumbent learning curves, experience, organizational capabilities, know-
how; Incumbents with proprietary technology/level of technology; Political 
resources/relations 
Customer/market-based advantages – Brand; Bundling; Customer 
loyalty; Customer switching costs; Product differentiation 
Financial requirements or cost of market entry – Capital intensity of the 
market / Investment risk; Capital requirements; Costs of operating in foreign 
markets; Cultural distance; Government licensing requirements; High wages 
for employees and managers; Marketing intensity; R&D expense involved 
in entering / R&D intensity; Selling expenses involved in marketing; 
Special risk and uncertainty of entry; Sunk costs; Transaction costs 
23 
 
Profit expectation of entrants – Access to distribution channels; Dynamic 
limit-pricing; Excess capacity; Expected retaliation by incumbents; High 
profit rates earned by incumbents; Packing the product space / product 
scope; Rate of technology change 
Industry characteristics – Asset specificity; Availability of skilled labor; 
Government policies; Location; Patents; Seller concentration; Vertical 
integration 
 
2.2.2. Relevance of categories of barriers by entrant size 
In this chapter, the five groups of barriers to entry are reviewed according to 
their relevance for a small de novo entrant in relation to a large scale entrant 
with existing operations in another industry. As discussed in chapter 
previous chapters, the large entrants tend to have a more advantageous 
position when entering a market, largely due to their existing resources and 
capabilities (Grant 1991; Robinson & McDougall 2001; Blees & al. 2003; 
Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010).  
Blees and al. (2003) have studied the relevance of some barriers to entry 
from previous literature based on the size of the entrant. In their research 
they have concluded that over 40 percent of the studied barriers are specific 
to small entrants whereas only 8 percent could be considered as specific to 
larger entrants. Half of the barriers were considered as barriers to both.  
The barriers relevant for larger entrants all relate to the profit expectation of 
entrants; dynamic limit-pricing, excess capacity in the market and expected 
retaliation by incumbents are all factors that affect the potential profits in 
the market and thus would largely affect the entry decision for the larger 
entrants. The large entrants will benefit from their existing channels and 
relations through operating in other markets, and can usually encounter 
economies of scale far earlier than small companies. The large entrants 
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might also be able to divisionalize on their own, spreading the economic and 
business risk across a group of operations, not having to support the costs of 
entry to a new industry with outside financing but operate it from the cash 
flow from other operations. Thus the risks related to entry can be much 
lower for larger companies than they are for the small.  
When looking at the smaller entrants, the barriers to entry rise from all five 
groups of barriers with a significant emphasis on the financial 
requirements/cost of entry. The study would indicate that over 50 percent of 
the small entrant specific barriers would fall under this category of barriers. 
Thus, the financial requirements and the cost of entry could be considered a 
major factor deterring small company entry. Concerning the barriers 
relevant for both entrants, large and small, the weight is on the company 
specific advantages of the incumbents vs. the entrants and on the industry 
characteristics, with these two groups making up almost 70 percent of the 
relevant barriers independent of size. This finding could implicate that these 
two groups are the “generic” barriers to entry independent of the entrant 
characteristics that could only be influenced by the incumbents and the 
governments.  
Relevance of category of barriers 
for 
Large 
entrants 
Small 
entrants 
Both 
Company specific advantages 0 % 7 % 39 % 
Customer/market based advantages 0 % 13 % 11 % 
Financial requirements/cost of entry 0 % 53 % 17 % 
Profit expectation of entrants 100 % 13 % 6 % 
Industry characteristics 0 % 13 % 28 % 
 
Table 2 Relevance of categories of barriers to entry by entrant size  
(Adapted from Blees & al. 2003) 
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2.2.3. Influencing the barriers to entry 
In this section, the categories of barriers to entry are discussed in relation to 
the incumbents, entrants and governments and their power to influence the 
existence and height of the barriers. Earlier literature on the subject has 
indicated that the conditions for entry are different depending on the size of 
the entrant largely due to the limited resources and lack of existing 
capabilities of smaller entrants (e.g. Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998, Robinson 
& McDougall 2001, Blees & al. 2003; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). The 
entrants generally lack market power to be able to have an effect on the 
current competitive position in the industry (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; 
Pehrsson 2009).  Sadly, as discussed in the previous chapter, most types of 
barriers to entry are specific to small companies. 
Previous literature has mainly focused on the view of the incumbents and on 
their strategies on blocking new competition (Robinson & McDougall 2001; 
Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). In the same line, the potential to influence 
the barriers has largely focused on the incumbents’ actions and has ignored 
the view of the entrant. In addition, the structural characteristics of the 
industry have largely been accepted as factors that cannot be changed either 
by the incumbents or the entrants but the role of the government has been 
dismissed. One of the objectives of this thesis is to study the phenomenon 
from a triangular point of view, taking into account firstly the entrant and 
the entrant’s chances to influence the height of the barriers, secondly the 
incumbents and their power to influence the barriers, and thirdly the role of 
the government in terms of the structural barriers in an industry.  
One of the few studies conducted on the influencability of the barriers to 
entry have strongly indicated the powerful position of the incumbents as the 
creator and raiser of most barriers (Blees & al. 2003). In their study, Blees 
and al. (2003) indicated not only that the incumbents would have the most 
chances to affect the creation and the height of barriers to entry but implied 
that a large number of barriers would be structural and could not be affected 
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by the incumbents, the entrants nor the governments. These ‘uninfluencable’ 
barriers make up for 36 percent of the barriers to entry identified in the 
study, most falling in the categories of company specific advantages, 
financial requirements/cost of entry and industry characteristics. The great 
number of barriers that according to the authors could not be influenced by 
any of the three actors is affected by the short-term view of the study in 
question. The researchers only took into account the barriers that could be 
influenced by one of the actors at the point of entry and not the longer term 
influence of the actors’ behavior on the industry. As indicated by other 
studies (Hermans and al. 2009; Friedman & Taylor 2011), the government 
policies will have an effect on the industry structure that will over time 
change and affect the conduct of the actors and change the industry 
characteristics and dynamics. The study still does serve as an indication of 
the unbalanced power divide between the actors and especially the strong 
position of the incumbents as gate keepers to a market with only little 
chances for the entrants to influence the barriers. The incumbents influence 
sums up to 41 percent in total across all the identified barriers whereas the 
entrants would only have the chance to influence 2 percent of the barriers.  
 Incumbent Entrant Government None 
Company specific advantages 22 % 0 % 22 % 56 % 
Customer/market-based 
advantages 
50 % 17 % 17 % 17 % 
Financial requirements/cost of 
entry 
33 % 0 % 17 % 50 % 
Profit expectation of entrants 75 % 0 % 13 % 13 % 
Industry characteristics 33 % 0 % 33 % 33 % 
Total weighted influence:  41 % 2 % 20 % 36 % 
 
Table 3 Influencability of categories of barriers by actor  
(Adapted from Blees & al. 2003) 
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2.2.3.1. Incumbent influence 
The incumbents’ power to influence the barriers to entry is closely linked to 
the market power of the incumbents in the market. According to the 
industrial organization view, a company needs to be large enough to be able 
to affect the capacity in the market and be able to affect the market price 
through its actions (Bain 1956, Stigler 1968). Porter’s strategic management 
view (1980, 1985) discriminates less on the company size but does note that 
large companies have many benefits as their strategic actions are more 
likely to have an influence on the industry structure and conduct than those 
of the smaller companies and they are likely to have accumulated a large 
resource-base that they can exploit in their strategies (Grant 1991; Blees & 
al. 2003). From both theoretical points of view, the incumbents are the most 
significant actors in relation to the barriers to entry. Later research on 
barriers to entry has offered support to this view (e.g. Robinson & 
McDougall 2001, Blees & al. 2003; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010).  
As noted in the previous chapter, the incumbents have a strong chance to 
influence all five categories of barriers to entry. The means differ by 
industry and company size. Many advantages of the incumbents relate to 
different types of first-mover advantages (Harrigan 1981, 1983; Lieberman 
& Montgomery 1988). Getting to the market first, will allow the company to 
get ahead of the later competition and create very sustainable barriers 
affecting the industry structure. The incumbents can block distribution 
channels, affect the marketing intensity of the industry, build a strong brand 
and create intense customer loyalty and also be sure to communicate their 
powerful position in the market to potential entrants, affecting their 
judgment of the profit potential in the market (e.g. Schmalensee 1982; 
Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Shepherd 1997; Matthyssens & al. 1998). In 
addition, they are able to gain economies of scale and other cost advantages 
(Bain 1956; Stigler 1968). According to Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1998), 
raising the costs for the entrants is one of the most efficient ways in which 
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incumbents can deter entry. The potential to affect the industry structures is 
more evident in oligopolistic markets where the few large incumbents 
usually have much power over the other actors in the industry value chain 
(Harrigan 1983).  
Through their strategies, the incumbents can affect the consumer 
expectations on the product attributes in the market, can raise switching 
costs for the customers and affect the industry profit margins, making the 
potential entry costly and unattractive for entrants. One major aspect is also 
the control over resources in an industry – not only in terms of raw 
materials, machinery and other material resources but also in relation to 
immaterial resources, knowledge and other capabilities that will be very 
costly for an entrant to acquire, falling behind in competition (Grant 1991; 
Karakaya 2002; Blees & al. 2003; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010).   
Fear of retaliation by incumbents is a strong discouraging factor in the 
market entry decision by an entrant. According to Robertson and Gatignon 
(1991), the incumbents will have four choices on how to react to a new 
entrant. Firstly, they can abandon the market themselves if the new entrant 
would have sustainable competitive advantage over the incumbents. 
Secondly, they could accommodate the new entrant by allowing the industry 
to change through innovation and more competition. Thirdly, they can 
choose to ignore the entrant in case the entrant is deemed harmless. As a 
fourth option, the incumbent may choose to retaliate, signaling to the new 
entrant that it is willing and powerful enough to fight back. Previous 
research has shown that retaliatory actions are usually successful, especially 
when the incumbents are large and have a strong position in the market. 
Sometimes even convincing signaling about the expected retaliation is 
enough to keep the competition out of the market as the entry decision 
cannot be based on actual retaliation due to imperfect information but rather 
on the expected one (Thomas 1999). 
29 
 
Porter (1985) summarized in his research the three defensive strategies and 
tactics for the incumbents. These include the raising of structural barriers, 
increasing the expected retaliation, and lowering the inducement for attack. 
The strategies geared towards these goals are summarized in Figure 3 
below.  
 
Figure 3 Defensive incumbent strategies  
(Adapted from Porter 1985) 
Both the raising of many structural barriers and the increasing of expected 
retaliation would lead to significant added costs for the entrants thus 
affecting the financial requirements/cost of entry category which is the most 
relevant for new entrants. As a summary, the previous literature is well 
aligned with the powerful position of the incumbents and their potential to 
influence the barriers to entry. The effect is even more pronounced in 
consolidated markets where the incumbents are large.  
 
2.2.3.2. Entrant influence 
The previous literature on barriers to entry has mainly focused on the 
incumbents and on their strategies for deterring entry from new competition. 
Much less focus has been given to the entrants (e.g. Robinson & McDougall 
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2001; Porter 2008; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010). The entrant’s influence 
on the barriers can also be defined as ‘breaking’ or ‘tackling’ the barriers to 
entry. There are many indications in earlier research confirming that the 
entrants are in an asymmetrical position in relation to the incumbents and do 
not have many chances to influence the entry barriers created by the 
incumbents. Overcoming any of the barriers is very costly and time-
consuming and in case of a de novo entrant, both are on short supply (e.g. 
Cabral & Mata 2003). Previous research indicates that the entrant should 
first be able to overcome the absolute cost disadvantage for instance by 
developing new, more efficient production technologies or finding 
innovative sales and distribution channels that have not yet been blocked 
(Blees & al. 2003). Only after solving the initial cost disadvantage, the 
entrant would have any chance of entering a market – a notion especially 
true in capital or production intensive industries. Recent research has also 
supported the implication that the entrant’s innovativeness can decrease the 
capital needs and help in product differentiation (Han & al. 2001; Pehrsson 
2009).  
Fan (2010) has developed the idea of arch incumbency in his paper, 
implicating that a large market overlap of the entrant with an established 
incumbent has detrimental effects on the chances for survival on the new 
entrant. Other research has in addition shown that due to the lack of prior 
experience on the market, the de novo entrants are much more likely to face 
retaliatory actions from incumbents than other incumbents diversifying from 
another industry (e.g. Lieberman 1987; Simon 2005). According to the 
findings, this is largely related to the resource base and size of the entrant as 
there is also a cost involved in retaliating. Incumbent retaliation towards 
small de novo entrants can lead to pushing the new entrant out of business 
with fairly moderate costs for the incumbent and also discourage potential 
additional attempts of entry.  
The concept of arch incumbency can be beneficial to the entrant as 
according to Fan’s (2010) argument, entry forbearance from the arch 
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incumbent will likely lead to the acceptance of entry from other incumbents, 
too. He goes on to suggest that there are two potential strategies for the 
entrant to escape from retaliatory strategies displayed by the incumbents and 
thus increase its chances of survival. Adopting a different market 
positioning from the arch incumbent will likely lead to the chance of “going 
under the radar” and decreasing the possibility that the incumbent would 
consider it worthwhile to defend their position in the market. Focusing on a 
market niche, providing differentiation or adopting a low-cost strategy in 
opposition to the arch incumbent’s strategy can increase the chances for 
survival for the small entrant. Another potentially successful strategy would 
be an aggressive large scale entry. Vis-à-vis the incumbents, the entrant 
might through this strategy signal that it has sufficient resources to fight 
back, implicating that the cost for any retaliatory actions would be high for 
the incumbents.  
Blees and al. (2003) have suggested that the brand name barrier is the only 
one that can be lowered by the entrants’ actions. Even that would require 
significant spending on advertising and selling. 
Thus, the entrant is left with little power over the barriers to entry and in 
most instances can only hope to be able to jump over some of the barriers 
through formulating innovative strategies and ways of doing things that 
would catch the current industry status quo off guard, many times referred 
to as radical innovations that would change the industry structure and 
conduct (e.g. Chandy & Tellis 2000). Incumbents rarely are responsible for 
the industry changing innovations, strongly related to their unwillingness to 
cannibalize their own investments (Chandy & Tellis 1998) and their lack of 
strategic agility (Friedman & Taylor 2011). Still, the current research 
strongly suggests that only the incumbent strategies have the potential to 
affect the structural barriers to entry and the power to create strategic 
barriers to entry (Pehrsson 2009).  
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2.2.3.3. Government influence 
The policy decisions that the government makes have a long term influence 
on the barriers to entry in an industry. As Demsetz (1982) defined it, the 
question for policy makers in relation to barriers to entry should be to focus 
on which costs for entrepreneurs are socially desirable, leading into higher 
social welfare. For long, the focus has been too narrow, only looking at the 
costs of physical outputs for the industry incumbents and has neglected the 
implications of current policy setting for future incentives for innovation. 
Some authors also note the important role of the government as certain 
structural and strategic barriers in an industry can only be affected in the 
long run through policy decisions (Blees & al. 2003; Friedman & Taylor 
2011). These policies will in the long run determine the incentive for new 
entrepreneurs to innovate and try and enter an industry. Thus, they suggest 
that governments wishing to create an innovation friendly environment 
should focus on policies which will lower the structural and strategic 
barriers in an industry for new, small, innovative companies. High entry 
rates are also correlated with innovations and increases in production 
efficiency for the industry as a whole (Friedman & Taylor 2011). As birth 
and growth of new companies is the force keeping an industry competitive, 
leading into increased social and economic welfare (e.g. Porter 1990; 
Shaffer 1995; Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Lutz & al. 2010; Schivardi & 
Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 2012). New companies are also 
mainly responsible for innovations in a given industry and are almost solely 
the ones responsible for radical, industry changing innovations (e.g. 
Schumpeter 1939; Audretsch 2001; Friedman & Taylor 2011). 
Edler and Georghiou (2007) have introduced a taxonomy of innovation 
policy tools for governments. The more traditional focus has been on the 
supply-side measures, including tax incentives, government support and 
funding for research and development and public sector research, training 
programs, networking and information diffusion support. In the recent years 
it has been noted that demand is a major driver of innovation but demand-
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side measures have still not been recognized in public policies. One crucial 
side is state procurement, especially in industries where the public sector is 
a significant customer. Earlier research has shown that public procurement 
geared towards innovative solutions, creates even greater innovation 
incentives and in more areas that the traditional measures such as R&D 
subsidies, being a significantly more efficient innovation stimulus than any 
government subsidies (e.g. Geroski 1991; Edler & Georghiou 2007; 
Cullman & al. 2012). Focusing public procurement towards innovative 
solutions, the delivery of public services should improve also generating 
more positive innovative dynamics and creating a foundation for an 
innovation friendly environment (Edler & Georghiou 2007).  
The positive influence of public procurement is three fold (Edler & 
Georghiou 2007): Firstly, public procurement forms a major part of local 
demand in many industries stimulating innovation and enhancing the 
competitiveness in an area (Porter 1990), also offering much needed 
references for small companies. Secondly, asymmetries between the 
incumbents and small entrants rising from various reasons such as 
information asymmetries between the suppliers and the purchasers can be 
mitigated through public procurement, also helping small companies to 
reach a critical mass for innovations and help them reduce market risks, and 
enable learning and reaching economies of scale sooner. Thirdly, the public 
infrastructure and public services in general would benefit from innovation 
procurement through translating needs from the market to clear market 
demands and serving as an innovation lever linking public and private 
demand.  
Governmental authorities should set policies that would enhance the 
competitiveness of industries and companies within to simultaneously 
advance the social and economic conditions of the areas they operate in 
(Porter & Kramer 2011). A specific measure has been different anti-trust 
policies, with the aim of ensuring a level of competition in an industry, but 
governments should understand that they can also affect the strategic 
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barriers to entry, lowering the asymmetries between the incumbents and the 
entrants by e.g. limiting or expanding access to critical resources, creating 
distribution channels and ensuring channel access through policies, 
decreasing customer switching costs by prohibiting incumbents from 
creating costs for switching a supplier (Blees & al. 2003).  Constant 
vigilance is also needed as the incumbents will find clever new ways to 
block entry for entrants (Hermans & al. 2009, 117). Thus most of the 
barriers deemed uninfluencable by either party (entrants, incumbents or 
governments) at the point of entry, can actually be influenced by 
governments in the longer term, not having to accept the structural 
characteristics of an industry as set (Blees & al. 2003; Friedman & Taylor 
2011).  
In the following chapter, a brief literature review on the prior research on 
regulation of entry is presented.  
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3. Regulation of Entry 
The regulation of entry refers to the number of procedures, the time and the 
cost that a new company must go through and bear before it can operate 
legally in a territory (Djankov & al. 2002). These can include different 
licenses, permits or registrations that differ by the industry depending on the 
industry specific regulations. Some of the most common regulatory 
procedures are listed in Appendix 1.  
Even though many studies have shown that regulation often has asymmetric 
effects on the market competition and allows for incumbents to create a 
strong protective position in the market in relation to potential entrants (e.g. 
Leone 1986; Friedman & Taylor 2011), the macroeconomic consequences 
of regulation have long been poorly understood (Friedman & Taylor 2011).  
In this chapter regulation of entry is evaluated in terms of its social welfare 
and efficiency consequences, and through its effect on industry structure, 
market conditions, and competition.  
 
3.1. Regulation of Entry and Social Consequences 
These official costs of entry are very high in most countries but in reality 
represent only a small fraction of the total costs for entry for a de novo 
venture company. Reaching the license to operate is the first hurdle to entry 
has a significant effect on the industry structure, competition, and on firm-
level on profitability (Shaffer 1995). In addition, regulation has social 
consequences for the public due to its detrimental effects on industry 
competition (Porter 1990; Shaffer 1995; Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Lutz 
& al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 2012). 
Government regulation and legislation can often raise entry barriers and 
lead to favorable conditions for the incumbents (Shaffer 1995). The 
incumbents in an industry seek for beneficial legislation and regulation to 
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enhance their position vis-à-vis other industry actors and to protect 
themselves from potential entrants through what has been labeled as 
“strategic use of public policy” (Mitnick, 1981, Wood 1986).Companies can 
advance their political interest for instance by scanning the environment and 
selecting the markets to enter based on their political conditions, by 
lobbying, through political action committees or by building coalitions to 
mention a few (Shaffer 1995).  
The rationalization for the need for the government to act in a role of a 
regulator has been based on the theory of public interest. Pigou’s (1938 in 
Djankov & al. 2002) theory of regulation suggested that unregulated 
markets would be doomed to frequent failures and for social efficiency 
purposes, the government should pose regulation to protect the public from 
these failures. The government’s role is to ensure that new companies would 
meet set minimum standards for the provision of goods and services. To 
achieve this, the companies would need to register and acquire an official 
approval, signifying good repute in transactions with the public and other 
companies (Djankov & al. 2002). According to the theory, a higher number 
of government regulations should lead to superior social welfare.  
Later studies have focused on the effects of regulation on the industry 
competition and the outcomes and are defined as the public choice theory 
(Tullock 1967; Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976). The variants of the public 
choice theory see the inefficiency of Pigou’s public interest theory and have 
opposed the idea of regulation leading to social welfare by arguing that 
regulation is actually acquired by the incumbents in an industry for purposes 
of creating barriers to entry for new competitors and for increasing the 
profits for the incumbents.  Due to stricter regulation leading to risen 
barriers to entry for new companies, the incumbents are left with greater 
market power and higher profits, with the social welfare decreased with 
higher prices and reduced consumer choice (Djankov & al. 2002; Schivardi 
& Viviano 2010; Friedman & Taylor 2011; Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 
2012). Thus regulation leads to social and economic inefficiency.  
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An additional view to the public choice theory, labeled the “tollbooth view” 
(McChesney 1987; Shleifer and Vishny 1993), argues that as well as the 
incumbents in the industry can use regulation to promote their own 
purposes, so do the politicians and bureaucrats. Politicians are willing to 
work in sync with the industry incumbents as they are able to extract 
campaign contributions, votes, bribes and support from the industry actors. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have gone as far as suggesting that an important 
reason for the whole existence of permits and regulations is to give the 
officials the power to deny them and to collect brides for returning them. 
Thus the two views of the public choice theory are aligned with regulation 
leading to a significant decrease in social welfare and efficiency. In 
addition, both theories lead to favorable conditions to current industry status 
quo, leading to inferior treatment for new entrants, presenting the entrants 
with incomprehensible delays or a multitude of severe obstacles requiring 
large pay-offs to be overcome (Djankov & al. 2002).  
The effects of regulation in a market have also been theorized. Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2003) showed that the deregulation of the product market 
would lead to a lower price of goods and reduced barriers to entry, also 
creating new jobs and decreasing unemployment. In an indirect effect, it 
should also facilitate deregulation in labor markets. Felbermayr and Prat 
(2011) extended the findings by linking high unemployment to high costs of 
entry due to strict regulation. Shaffer (1995) modeled how the deregulation 
of price and entry in an industry would lead to positive social consequences 
by improving economic efficiency and consumer welfare, and elimination 
entry barriers at firm level. Herrendorf and Teixeirai (2011) argued that 
strict regulation leads to high barriers to entry which is a statistically 
significant explanatory factor in the development of countries, hindering 
both economic and social development. In addition to these studies, scholars 
agree that regulation is a key component behind structural barriers hindering 
competition and deterring entry (e.g. Djankov & al. 2002, Blanchard & 
Giavazzi 2003; Lutz & al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 
2012; Prantl 2012).   
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As the previous literature has argued, regulation will not only lead to 
decreased social welfare and efficiency consequences but also to an 
asymmetric industry structure and to injured competition, especially in 
industries governed by high levels of regulation such as in the medical, 
automobile, telecommunications, and electric power industries. In the next 
chapter the characteristics of a highly regulated market are discussed.  
3.2. Regulation of Entry and Industry Effects 
The industry structure is a combination of many factors such as the number 
of companies, the nature of competitive environment, cultural, judicial, and 
political systems – and the government regulation either directly or 
indirectly affect each of these pieces (Hermans & al. 2009). The 
government’s task is to determine which interventions and policies will in 
the longer term become net efficiency enhancing for increase social welfare 
and which ones will lead to market power enhancement and loss of social 
welfare (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998, Friedman & Taylor 2011). These 
decisions can have far-reaching effects as governmental regulation in terms 
of policies and different interventions in an industry has a direct effect on 
the industry structure, often leading to oligopolistic structures and 
consolidation in the market (Blees & al. 2003; Hermans & al. 2009; 
Friedman & Taylor 2011).  
Once the government wishes to shape the current industry outcomes and 
puts policies and laws into force that will lead to a restructuring of the 
industry. The changed structure will have an effect on the industry conduct 
i.e. on how the actors in an industry will act and how will they interact, 
leading to different competitive strategies by the companies in the industry. 
Industry actors can also affect the structure of an industry by changing their 
conduct, for instance through mergers and acquisition, or vertical or 
horizontal integration, often leading to consolidation and to higher barriers 
to entry (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998). Such changes in industries have 
often been the consequences of fallen industry profitability and 
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performance. Thus, the industry structure and conduct will have an effect on 
the industry performance. Closing the circle, the industry performance will 
lead to different macroeconomic outcomes for societies. Whether the 
outcomes will be positive or negative concerning social welfare, is 
dependent on how the industry has reacted through its structure and conduct 
to the changes in the government regulation and whether the changes in the 
industry have led to a net efficiency gain or only to an increase in market 
power. (Hermans & al. 2009) Thus the economics of consolidation in an 
industry and the loss of competition is strongly related to social welfare and 
governments should be very aware of the far-reaching potential industry 
consequences of the regulations they pose (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; 
Blees & al. 2003; Hermans & al. 2009; Friedman & Taylor 2011).  
 
Figure 4 Government regulation effect on Industry  
(Adapted from Hermans & al. 2009) 
The impact of the barriers to entry does not only have implications to the 
loss of competition leading to improved profitability and market power for 
the industry incumbents but to higher prices and loss of social welfare for 
the public. In addition, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) have argued in their 
research that high barriers to entry in addition to high levels of 
concentration in an industry are significant factors in the slow employment 
growth in Europe during the last decades. They criticize the thinking that the 
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simple reform of the labor markets would lead to improved job creation 
when governments should actually focus on eliminating entry regulation and 
barriers to entry to generate employment growth on sustainable basis 
(Bertrand & Kramarz 2002).  
 
3.3. Regulation and Innovation  
The birth and growth of new companies is an important prerequisite for 
wealth creation and quality of life (Birch 1987; Kirchhoff 1991; Hitt et al. 
1999; Robinson & McDougall 2001) and by ensuring competitiveness in an 
industry, it can help in avoiding the negative social consequences of high 
consolidation in an industry. According to Schumpeter (1939), the industry 
incumbents are rarely driven to innovate but innovations primarily emerge 
from new companies. More recent studies have confirmed the continued 
validity of Schumpeter’s research and labels the entrants as change agents 
responsible for bringing innovations to market (Chandy & Tellis 2000; 
Audretsch 2001; Friedman & Taylor 2011). Innovation is a number one 
driver for growth and a key factor in ensuring a nation’s global 
competitiveness (Porter 1990).  
According to Porter’s (1990) Diamond Model, the innovation intensity is 
dependent on four key conditions: Factor conditions, demand conditions, 
related and supporting industries, and market structure. Porter argues that 
spatial competitiveness can be achieved through ensuring that there four 
factors are aligned to support innovating in an area. His argument goes that 
the interaction of highly specialized resources, sophisticated customers, 
internationally competitive supporting industries and intense domestic 
competition are the antecedents for innovation and the international 
competitiveness of a country Porter (1990). In highly regulated markets, the 
whole industry has been consolidated to serve the goal of higher profits and 
larger market shares and the innovation promoting structures, especially 
competition forcing companies to innovate to stay ahead, are largely 
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missing. As discussed in the previous chapter, the government regulation 
has a strong impact on the industry structure and conduct with also far-
reaching effects that were unforeseen at the time of the regulation setting. 
High government regulation has been shown to lead to consolidated 
structures and low incentives for innovation, with incumbent companies 
rather focusing on building even higher barriers to entry than on innovation 
(Schumpeter 1939). Furthermore, high barriers to entry might discourage 
new companies from entering the market which might have a negative effect 
on competition and on the whole dynamics of the market, resulting in more 
consolidation. This in turn often will lead to higher prices for the public and 
to low rate and quality of innovation (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998).  
Government interventions on structure and conduct through actions such as 
price limiting are usually driven out of the short-term need for cost-cutting 
without taking into account the long-run influence on innovation (Hermans 
& al. 2009). Once the industry matures, the competition becomes more rigid 
and economies of scale become more important (Robinson & McDougall 
2001). Industry restructuring for higher efficiency leads to high 
consolidation and higher barriers to entry for new entrants – the ones who 
are responsible for most innovations – and the rate of innovation in an 
industry withers (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998). Introducing innovation to 
an industry will not only benefit the innovating company but the spill-over 
effects of learning and technological improvements can benefit the whole 
industry or even a country or a region (Edler & Georghiou 2007).  
Economic theory and earlier research suggest that governments seeking to 
promote innovation and to build innovation-friendly environments for new 
companies to prosper in, should focus on the longer-term effects of the 
regulations on the industry. In addition, as innovation is largely driven by 
competition, the government should seek to lower the barriers to entry for 
new companies (e.g. Friedman & Taylor 2011).  
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According to Blees and al. (2003), entrants have two important functions to 
perform in an industry; entrants serve as equilibrating and disequilibrating 
factors. First of all, the profit levels in an industry will, according to 
economic theory, rise above long-run competitive levels in time, attracting 
new companies to enter the market. Once the new companies will enter, the 
profits should decrease to a long-run competitive level as a result of a 
balancing act created by the entrants. In this scenario, the entrants serve as 
the equilibrators in an industry. Secondly, the entrants serve as agents of 
change, being responsible for bringing new innovations to market 
(Audretsch 2001) and driving the incumbents to change and innovate due to 
the threat they pose. Thus, smaller companies are rarely created to imitate 
large incumbents but to serve as change agents through their innovative 
activities. In this scenario, the entrants serve as the disequilibrators in an 
industry (Audretsch and Mata 1995).  
In freely functioning markets, the constant threat of disruptive innovations 
from new companies should work as incentive to innovate for the 
incumbents. In regulated and consolidated markets the mechanism is often 
sadly broken making it easier for the incumbents to focus on finding new 
ways to block entry for the innovative new companies than to innovate 
themselves (Hermans & al. 2009, 117). Thus the regulation leading to 
consolidation has a crippling effect on both the creation of new companies 
and on the rate of innovation and change in an industry. Without the 
equilibrating and disequilibrating effects, the market will not function at its 
optimal state, with allocative and dynamic efficiency (Blees & al. 2003). 
Due to the detrimental effects on industry dynamics and economic welfare, 
the main goal of competition policies in recent years has been the lowering 
of barriers to entry and preventing them from arising (Burke and To, 2001).  
The barriers to entry are still very present in many industries, with the 
highly regulated industries as prime examples. In the next section, an 
overview of the previous literature on market entry and the barriers to entry 
is reviewed.  
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4. Synthesis of the literature review 
In this literature study, the previous research on barriers to entry has been 
reviewed, especially to understand the antecedents for the industry structure 
of highly regulated markets and to study the role of different actors in the 
industry environment, namely the entrants, incumbents and governments.  
The previous literature and economic theory understand that the creation 
and growth of new companies is essential to economic welfare (e.g. Hitt et 
al. 1999; Robinson & McDougall 2001) but still the survival odds for small 
companies are very low due to high barriers to entry (e.g. Porter 1980; Yip 
1982; Geroski 1991) especially in regulated industries (e.g. Djankov & al. 
2002).  
Earlier research on the subject has focused on the point of view of the 
incumbents and on the strategies to defend their market positions in keeping 
new entrants out of the market (Porter 1979; Robinson & McDougall 2001; 
Porter 2008; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010), leaving the implications of 
barriers to entry for the entrant an important, yet understudied field. 
Understanding the implications of regulation on the industry structure and 
on the barriers to entry for entrants is vital for new entrants to be able to 
make more enlightened choices on the strategies and modes of entry, to 
ensure that innovation and new competition can enter and survive even in 
regulated industries. Ensuring competition in an industry through the entry 
of new companies will affect the rate of innovation in an industry and lead 
to increased social welfare for societies as a whole (e.g. Shaffer 1995; 
Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Lutz & al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; 
Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 2012). As this literature review has suggested, 
unfortunately the current regulatory measures often do not serve their 
purpose but often lead to oligopolistic structures and consolidation in 
industries, promoting the current status quo favoring the incumbents over 
entrants.  
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In chapter 2, the 42 barriers to entry identified from previous research are 
gathered and categorized, based on the source of the barrier. The chances to 
influence the barriers are very few for the entrants and great many for the 
incumbents. Also the role of the government is discussed as the government 
has an important role in affecting the long term developments in an industry 
and can promote innovation friendly structures through policy setting 
keeping in mind the longer term consequences of such policies. Public 
procurement through demand-side measures geared towards innovations is 
one example of governments’ means to lower the barriers to entry and 
support small company creation and balance the asymmetries between the 
incumbents and the entrants in an industry.  
As discussed in the previous sections, barriers to entry can influence the 
industry profitability levels and the competitive structure significantly. In 
industries where the barriers to entry are high, consolidated and often 
oligopolistic structures are likely to form, decreasing competition in the 
market and leading to decreased economic and social welfare, and a lower 
rate of innovation (e.g. Shaffer 1995; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; 
Bertrand & Kramarz 2002; Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Blees & al. 2003; 
Hermans & al. 2009; Lutz & al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman 
& al. 2012; Prantl 2012).  
As the previous theories have suggested a strong link between high 
regulation and high entry barriers, it is assumed that the barriers to entry for 
de novo entry in the health care industry would be a significant deterring 
factor. In addition, as the previous research suggests that the entrants have 
only very little chance of tackling the barriers to entry and only in very 
costly manners, the theoretical assumptions would deem entry by a small de 
novo entrant into the highly regulated and consolidated health care industry 
extremely difficult as the entrant would be imposed not only to high 
structural barriers but also to a variety of strategic barriers created by the 
strong incumbents in the industry.  
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Building on this literature review, an empirical section will follow in which 
a small company seeking to enter a highly regulated health care industry 
with an innovative offering is studied and through a case study structure the 
current academic understanding of the barriers to entry for de novo entrant 
in a regulated industry is extended and the entrant’s chances of tackling the 
barriers to gain entry are examined. The case study takes the point of view 
of the entrant, seeking to add to the current understanding of the types of 
barriers to entry for the new entrant in an industry that is defined by much 
consolidation and very high barriers to entry. New knowledge is built by 
studying the history of the company and its struggles with different barriers 
to entry and the ways in which it has tackled these barriers to be able to 
break into the market. In addition, the role of the government as the 
regulator but also as an actor seeking to support growth and competitiveness 
leading to increased social welfare in an area is studied and implications are 
drawn to policy makers from studying the influence of different policy 
measures on the case company.  
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PART III – EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY 
This section of the thesis introduces a case study on a de novo venture 
company, seeking to enter a highly regulated health care market. The aim of 
this section is to study the empirical reality concerning the barriers to entry 
in a regulated industry and especially identifying the barriers for a de novo 
entrant in a regulated setting and studying how can it tackle these barriers 
with limited resources. In addition, the role of the government in its dual 
role as a regulator but also as a supporter of new innovations in an industry 
is discussed.  
The case study builds on the findings of the literature review and adds new 
knowledge to the current body of research by studying the empirical reality 
on barriers to entry for a small de novo entrant in a regulated industry. At 
the end of the empirical case study, the findings of the case study are 
discussed in comparison with the theoretical background.   
 
5. Research methodology and approach 
In this section, the research methodology used in this study is presented and 
the data collection methods are reviewed. In addition, the reliability and 
validity of the study are discussed.  
 
5.1. Methodology 
The study in question will utilize a case study as a research strategy. The 
justification of the method choice relies on work by Yin (2003), who argues 
that the selection of research method should depend on three criteria: the 
type of research question, the level of control that investigator has over the 
actual behavioral events and the degree of focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical phenomena. Within these criteria case studies should 
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be preferred as the research strategy when the study is mainly answering to 
questions “how” or “why”, when the investigator has little control over 
events under the study and when the focus of the study is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 2003). As the main 
research question of this study is to examine ‘how’ de novo venture 
companies can tackle the barriers of entry they face, that in addition is a 
phenomenon in a real-life context that has not been adequately studied 
previously, case study is the chosen method for this study.  
Eisenhardt (1989) has developed a structure for conducting case studies. She 
argues that one of the strengths of the case study approach is its likelihood 
of leading to the generation of novel theory that is one of the research aims 
of this study. Building on the literature review, the empirical reality is 
studied in order to add to the current knowledge on the importance of the 
identified barriers to entry for small scale de novo entrants in a regulated 
industry and generate new theory on the chances for the entrant to influence 
the barriers to entry. In addition, the role of the government is studied and 
the findings are mirrored to the current body of literature.   
Following Yin’s (2003) typology of the case study method, this study is 
explanatory in nature, with the aim of testing theories by identifying and 
explaining causal relationships of this new target phenomenon. This study 
also has some exploratory characteristics that refer to gathering of 
information and generating new theories on new and unexplored 
phenomena.  
Firstly, the study aims to shed light on how companies with limited 
resources are able to break the barriers to entry in a highly regulated 
industry. Secondly, through combining current research knowledge and 
building from the practices of the case study company in question, this study 
has the aim to provide new knowledge on the market entry strategies of 
small companies with limited resources trying to break through the high 
regulatory barriers. Thirdly, the influence of the government policies on 
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these barriers to entry is examined and implications for future entrants and 
policy makers are introduced.  
The unit of analysis of the study is how the case company tackles the 
barriers to entry they face to enter into the medical device industry that is 
one of the most highly regulated markets globally. As the case company is a 
small de novo venture company with limited resources, according to current 
theory, it has little chance in influencing the barriers to entry but the case 
study questions how it has still been able to break into the market through 
strategies and tactics it has exploited to tackle the obstacles. These means of 
tackling the barriers to entry are of specific interest in this study. From 
identifying these strategies used and building theory from these strategies, 
this study seeks to gather new knowledge on a market entry to highly 
regulated markets that would benefit small companies and any company 
with limited resources. Also, by contrasting the findings of the case study to 
current theory on market entry, the current theory can be critically assessed 
and possibly added to. To reach this end, a holistic single-case study design 
is used (Yin 2003). 
The research philosophy of this study is strongly post-positivist with a focus 
of finding patterns, explaining phenomena and testing new theories while 
critically evaluating current theories. This critical realism focus is at the 
heart of this case study approach building on a theoretical background. 
Critical realism underlines the case study approach that seeks to understand 
the single setting that still cannot be even described and studied wholly. The 
case study approach as a modified experimental methodology suits the 
purposes of this study well.  
 
5.2. Data collection 
The primary data collection method is interviews with the case company’s 
key personnel. In addition, different actors of the Finnish innovation support 
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system have been interviewed to understand the support structures in place 
and to assess the role of the government policies in the industry 
environment.  The people interviewed are considered as “informed sources” 
relating to the questions present in this research. Interviews are the primary 
method of data collection but in addition different material internal to the 
company and also related material gathered from external sources will be 
utilized to gain a broad view of the industry, the barriers to entry and 
different actors in the company environment.  
5.2.1. Interviews 
The interviews with both the company key personnel and innovation system 
actors were the primary data collection method in this research. As the study 
focuses on understanding the barriers to entry present in a regulated industry 
and the strategies through which the company itself and the government 
actors can influence these barriers, the interviews focused on both the 
current situation but also on identifying chances for improvement. During 
the study, 26 interviews were conducted with 20 different individuals.  
The first wave of interviews included open interviews with the case 
company key personnel designed to give an understanding of the industry, 
the case company history, its operations, products and current markets. In 
addition, some external informants were contacted in order to get insight to 
the regulation present in the industry. The scope of this study and the 
specific research questions were designed during this phase and the 
relationship between the literature study and the empirical study were 
designed.  
The second wave of interviews included a wider range of company 
personnel from different functions to gain understanding of the barriers to 
entry affecting a range of operations within the case company. 
Representatives from Sales and Marketing, Quality and Regulatory, 
Clinical, Finance and Administration, Production, and Research and 
Development were interviewed. In addition, external experts in the 
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company’s environment including Finnish innovation system actors were 
interviewed to assess the role of the government in relation to the barriers to 
entry and their support for small companies and innovations. The interviews 
in the second wave were conducted as semi-structured interviews. Some of 
the informants were contacted after the interview by email to clarify any 
comments once the data had been transcribed.   
The third wave included confirmatory interviews with some of the key 
informants to assess whether the drawn implications and conclusions made 
sense and to determine areas for further research.  
The interviews were primarily conducted face-to-face but with a few 
informants, they were conducted through a teleconference due to 
geographical distance. To facilitate deep understanding of the phenomenon, 
open ended questions were used and clarifying questions were asked during 
the interviews. Also, the interviewees were encourages to speak freely of 
any additional themes that might be related to the topic even if not touched 
upon by the interviewer. All the interviews were recorded and later 
transcribed by the interviewer. A list of the interviews conducted with both 
case company personnel and external actors is provided in References. 
5.2.2. Secondary data sources 
In addition to the interviews, documents received from the case company 
were used to gain a deeper understanding of the industry characteristics and 
the company history. Furthermore, the innovation system actors provided 
documents to aid in understanding the role of the support system actors and 
the Finnish government innovation policy. The additional material is listed 
in chapter 9, References. 
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5.3. Reliability and validity of the study 
The reliability of the study refers to the imitability of the study in another 
point of time with the same results, i.e. if the study was repeated using the 
same protocol described in this study, would another researcher receive the 
same results and findings that those concluded in this study. Thus, reliability 
is a measure of research quality, aiming at reducing the bias and errors in 
the study dependent of the researcher. The validity of the research refers to 
the suitability of the study in explaining the phenomena it was used to study 
i.e. whether the study measures, researches and explains the phenomena it 
was used to explain. Validity can be divided into external validity, the 
establishment of the context in which the results of the study can be 
generalized, and to construct validity, referring to ensuring that the 
operational measures of the concepts used in the study are correct. (Yin 
2003) 
Interviews that have been used as the primary data collection method in this 
study, are a justified data collection method due to their character of 
allowing the researchers to gain an insightful understanding to the studied 
phenomenon but may raise questions relating to the reliability of the study 
as the reliability of the interviews relied strongly on the objectivity and 
truthfulness of the interviewees and the interviewer (Eisenhardt 1989). Yin 
(2003) has offered some recommendations on how to increase the reliability 
of a case study, through the use of a case study protocol and a case study 
database, which both have been used in this study. Firstly, the case study 
protocol was designed based on a research plan, the literature review and 
interview structures. Secondly, all the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed by the researcher directly after the interview, the latest the next 
day. All the transcriptions, including the notes made by the researcher 
during the interview, were saved into the case study database.  
Yin (2003) has suggested that the external validity of a single case study can 
be increase through theory building. By nature, the generalizability of the 
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results obtained through a single case study is questionable but in order to 
increase the external validity of this study, one of the aims is to contribute to 
the current academic knowledge by extending and adding to the current 
theory on barriers to entry in a specific type of an industry setting. As there 
is a lack of previous research on the point of view of the entrant and as 
previous research has suggested that the industry characteristics affect the 
studied phenomenon largely, the chosen method is likely to offer a chance 
to develop new theoretical contributions to the current body of literature.  
The construct validity can be problematic in case study research according 
to Yin (2003) but can be improved by using multiple sources of data, 
establishing a chain of evidence, and reviewing the work with key 
informants during the different stages of the study. The three methods have 
been used in this study to improve the construct validity, firstly by using a 
range of informants from different backgrounds both within the case 
company and also in its environment, secondly by following the case 
protocol and case database, and thirdly by reviewing the findings of the 
study and the process with key informants as a third wave of data collection.   
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6. Case study background 
The empirical part of this study involves a case study focusing on the 
market entry of a Finnish medical device company and especially on 
identifying the barriers to entry the company has faced in the regulated 
market it is seeking to enter. First, an overview of the company background 
is given, followed by an introduction to the market.    
 
6.1. Case company background – Mendor Oy 
The case company is a small Finnish medical device company designing, 
developing, manufacturing and marketing advanced products for diabetes 
management. The company was founded in 2006 and after a successful 
presentation of their business plan in a national Venture Cup competition, 
the development of their first product began. After several years of intensive 
work together with specialists and end users, its first product – an innovative 
all-in-one portable blood glucose meter - was ready in close to the year end 
in 2009 and received a CE mark required to start the sales of the product in 
the EU area, in late 2010. (IV1) 
The product is based on similar technologies already in the market but 
represents a usability innovation as the device is a first product in the market 
to have successfully integrated the needed components for daily blood 
glucose management, differentiating from the traditional solutions and 
offering value for the patients due to its ease-of-use, discreetness, non-
medical appearance and fastness of measuring. (IV1; IV13; IV18) Due to 
the risks involved in innovation activities such as in gaining regulatory 
approvals, including extensive and costly trials for proving safety and 
efficacy of new technologies, the innovations in the industry are mostly 
focused on usability and only on incremental innovations in technologies. 
(IV4; IV17; IV23)  
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During the course of its research and development work, the company 
pursued support from different Finnish innovation support system actors, 
including funding for their R&D activities from TEKES (The Finnish 
Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation), and the services from 
business incubators such as Spinno. In addition, the company worked with 
an advisor from Keksintösäätiö (The Foundation for Finnish Innovations) in 
the early stages to develop the business plan and to seek assistance in 
gathering market information. (IV1) 
Already very early in their research on the market the company understood 
the challenges posed by the differential health care systems in different 
European countries where much purchasing is done through public 
tendering procedures. For instance, in Finland the supplies for self-
monitoring of diabetes are covered by the municipalities that procure the 
supplies through tender procedures aiming at lower costs held generally 
every 4-5 years. This combined with the small home market gave the 
direction for the company to start international market entry from the very 
beginning. (IV1; IV13) Very soon it became clear for the company that even 
with an innovative new offering with differential value to end-users, market 
entry is very difficult in a market characterized by high regulation, 
bureaucracy and conservatism with key stakeholders, significant 
consolidation and increased cost concerns throughout the value chain. (IV4; 
IV9; IV16; IV18; IV20)  
Currently, the company employs approximately 30 people and is continuing 
its growth into different markets after securing important partnerships in key 
markets such as in the UK and is currently in the final stages of negotiating 
a pan-European distribution deal with an experienced partner. The company 
strategy is to work through distributors in foreign markets but have decided 
to keep their home markets, Finland and Sweden, as a part of their direct 
sales channel to maintain direct contact with end users (IV13). Nevertheless, 
the company continues to have significant challenges with the barriers to 
entry in this highly regulated and consolidated market as a small innovative 
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player in the market characterized by strong incumbents and fierce 
competition for market share. In the next section a brief introduction to the 
market is given. 
6.2. Market overview 
Diabetes is a chronic disease affecting over 200 million people globally – a 
number that is expected to double within the next 25 years. The current 
estimated value of the market for blood glucose monitoring is 
approximately 6.5 billion euros globally with continued growth of 3-4 % per 
year due to increased prevalence and awareness of diabetes, continued 
obesity epidemic, improved diagnosis, better insulin treatment requiring 
more frequent monitoring of blood glucose levels, and current suboptimal 
testing frequencies. The share of blood glucose monitoring is only some 3-5 
% of the total economic burden caused by the disease, with the costs of 
complications making up for a lion’s share of the total costs. (IV3; IV23; 
DOC1; DOC5) In Finland for instance, the total costs of diabetes are 
approximately 1.35 billion euros on yearly basis, some 10 % of the total 
health care costs. Out of the costs of diabetes, the costs of treatment are less 
than 30 % (medical supplies some 3 % of the total costs) whereas the costs 
of complications due to suboptimal treatment create 55 % of the total costs. 
(DOC3) Research in this area has shown that by focusing more resources on 
the early and improved treatment of the disease, including more intensive 
blood glucose monitoring, the chances of diabetic complications could be 
halved with a much greater decreasing impact on the total costs than the 
increase in costs due to optimal treatment. (IV23; DOC3) 
The market for the blood glucose monitoring of diabetes developed in the 
1980’s as an answer to the growing diabetes epidemic with technologies for 
self-monitoring of blood glucose levels for purposes of guiding the 
treatment and also to help in insulin and oral drug dosage. The rate of 
innovation was fast in the past decades together with double digits growth 
rates in the market that were expected to continue with the explosion of the 
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disease with the key companies building their market share with introducing 
a plethora of new devices, through mergers and acquisitions, and taking 
control over distribution channels, driving the national health care systems 
onto the verge of bankruptcy. The basic technology has been the same since 
the mid-90’s with the market being characterized by increased saturation 
and commoditization with little segmentation while innovation has been 
replaced by fierce competition over market share and tight control on costs. 
(IV3; IV13; IV18) 
The basic business model in the market is based on significant initial costs 
with the meters being placed free of charge in to the market with the profit 
being made on test strip sales that would follow meter placement. The 
market offered huge margins to the key players until some 5 years ago when 
the national health care systems could not bear the costs anymore and 
started declining treatment based on the type of diabetes, putting price caps 
on reimbursement and restricting strip usage. Since then the four key 
incumbents, owning up to 80-85 % of the market share globally, have 
focused on cost control and maintenance of their position, now fighting over 
a slow and stabilized market in comparison to a hugely growing market. The 
key incumbents still have huge profit margins based on their proprietary 
strip technologies that are far beyond the competitive level, and have 
massive organizations and operations in place to support the massive 
profitability that they are ferociously defending. (IV3; IV4; IV8;  IV13; 
IV18; DOC5) 
The large incumbents have not a series of incremental innovations to the 
market in the past decade but small companies have been responsible for 
more radical innovations in the market, much as Schumpeter already has 
argued (1939). The possible explanations are many e.g. the unwillingness to 
cannibalize own market share or the risks and costs of developing products 
that might not gain the necessary regulatory approvals (IV16; IV18). The 
small companies often have the ability to innovate but are lacking the 
resources needed for market entry in this industry that has not traditionally 
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awarded innovation at its own right but requires significant sales and 
marketing muscle even with an innovative offering. The total financing need 
for getting the product ready is only a fraction of the costs of market entry. 
(IV4; IV11; IV16; IV19; IV23) Often the situation leads to small companies 
either dying once their cash runs out due to the significant time and the 
amount of resources that it takes to gain market entry or being bought by 
one of the large incumbents, further leading to continued consolidation. 
(IV23)  
The high regulation in the industry has led to an environment of 
bureaucracy, conservatism and substantial risk aversion in the industry, 
labeling each stakeholder and decision maker. These more structural 
characteristics create significant barriers to entry for new competition in the 
industry, preserving structures that often favor the incumbents. The fierce 
competition in the market characterized by a few strong and powerful 
incumbents owning most of the global market share has led to severe 
strategic barriers to entry for new competition with the incumbents 
defending their share of the market with all they can, not only against the 
other incumbents but jointly against new competition. (IV13; IV16; IV23) 
As discussed in chapter 2.1., this rarely leads to favorable social welfare 
consequences, especially in the health care market where the public are the 
key stakeholders and the costs are being funded from the government 
budgets.  
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7. Barriers to entry at Mendor Oy 
In the following chapter the barriers to entry faced by Mendor Oy in its 
international commercialization efforts are presented and analyzed. The key 
barriers to entry are also identified. The section is structured similarly to the 
theoretical part, by first defining the barriers to entry, then identifying their 
importance and then discussing the chances for different actors to influence 
these identified barriers. The entrant’s influence on the barriers can also be 
defined as ‘breaking’ or ‘tackling’ the barriers to entry.  
 
7.1. Company market entry and barriers 
First, a brief description of the company’s history since the start of their 
market entry efforts is provided and then the barriers to entry the company 
has faced in market entry are introduced.  
7.1.1. Brief history of market entry efforts 
The company started commercializing its new product directly after it 
gained the CE mark approval in late 2010. For the CE mark approval the 
company had had to undergo extensive clinical trials required by the 
applicable medical device and in-vitro diagnostics standards. Even before 
the research and development process for the product could start, the 
company needed to build a quality system to respond to the documentation 
requirements listed in the applicable standards for design and manufacture 
of medical and in-vitro diagnostic devices. (IV13) 
The company’s research and development efforts were funded using a 
mixture of public funding available from Tekes, the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation, and private funding gained after the 
company had won a Venture Cup competition and managed to attract some 
private investments. (IV1; IV2) Once the product was ready and approved, 
the company started looking into market entry, with a plan to first cover the 
59 
 
European territory and then expanding their sales into other market areas. 
(IV1) Even though the CE mark guaranteeing the safety and efficacy of the 
device and serving as a sales permission on a European level, each country 
still has their own infrastructure for their health care organizations and 
purchasing. Even though the end user of the device will be a diabetic patient 
from the public, in each country the health care system is at least partly 
reimbursing the supplies for blood glucose testing for the diagnosed 
patients. (IV3) 
In some European countries such as in Sweden and Finland, the 
municipalities are responsible for the purchase of the supplies for the local 
diabetic population that are procured for periods of 2-5 years through 
competitive bidding in tenders, based on a criteria of certain quality related 
requirements and price. The companies with the winning bids will be 
selected as the sole suppliers for the next tender period and the choice of 
blood glucose meter for the diabetes patient is restricted to the few options 
that were selected for the agreement period. The treating diabetes nurse will 
together with the patient decide which product would be the most suitable 
one for the patient and can also choose which meters they will present to the 
patient. (IV13; IV21; IV23) In some other markets such as in the UK, the 
National Health Service will reimburse a majority of the costs of the 
supplies to the patient who will have the choice in selecting their meter from 
a selection of products presented to them by their treating diabetes specialist 
nurse. Due to increasing cost cutting pressures, different areas have also 
started restricting the availability of the products to select from based on 
their price thus also limiting the choice for the patient and creating an extra 
step from the supplying companies to the end user. (IV16)  
The private market for diabetes supplies is only a few percent consisting of 
people who would rather finance their supplies themselves to be able to 
choose their preferred product freely (IV13; IV16). Thus in the medical 
device market there are three key stakeholders that in many instances have 
different ambitions: the end users (the patient), the gate keepers (the health 
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care professionals) and the payers (municipalities or social insurance 
systems funded from the government budgets). The structure of the health 
care system varies from country to country as do the levels of 
reimbursement that will set a cap to pricing of the products in the respective 
market. (IV13; IV16; IV23) 
As their understanding of the varied practices in each of the markets grew, 
the company realized that their own resources would not be sufficient to 
gain entry in several different markets and decided to start looking for 
distribution partners. A decision was made to still keep Finland as a direct 
sales market to stay in direct contact with the customers and a sales team 
consisting of two people started working with different Finnish 
municipalities in anticipation of the opening of the next tenders. Some 
companies from other countries became interested and negotiations on 
distribution started. During this time, the main goal was to start the sales in 
as many markets as possible and little criteria was used in the selection of 
the distributors, due to a combination of lack of market understanding and 
the need to start generating cash flow due to financial pressures. (IV1) In 
parallel with the search of distributor partners in many countries, the 
company also needed to build up their production capabilities and hired 
many new people to help with the production scale-up and 
commercialization activities, increasing the need for capital. The company 
started negotiations for additional funding both with existing and new 
investors, hoping to raise enough capital to secure their funding needs 
before their break-even point. The funding was secured in the spring of 
2011, around the same time when the company started cooperation with its 
first distribution partner in Greece. (IV1; IV2) 
Soon the company realized that their expectations of the time to market and 
the barriers that they would face to enter into any of the key markets were 
highly optimistic. Even though the company was discussing with several 
distribution companies in many countries, the progress seemed to be very 
slow. In addition, many resources were being tied to negotiations with 
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several different companies with no clear structure and with no visible 
progress. (IV1; IV2; IV16) Moving towards the latter part of the year 2011 
without much success in the difficult home market in Finland or with the 
Greek distribution partnership, the company decided to take on a new 
strategy based on their increased understanding of the amount of 
knowledge, expertise and dedicated resources needed to be able to penetrate 
the market. The company understood that they will need a committed 
partner, already heavily involved in diabetes that will have the resources and 
the expertise that the company itself was lacking. (IV1; IV16) 
The new strategic direction could be defined as moving away from a 
shotgun approach to targeted hunting of resourceful and experienced 
partners that could offer Mendor reach across many countries and real 
penetration in the difficult industry (IV16). Pressured by the need for 
immediate cash flow, also to convince the investors of positive 
developments, the company still continued negotiating with smaller 
distribution companies in single countries (IV1). The new targeted approach 
started bearing fruit once a large multinational pharmaceutical company got 
interested in the company’s offering and in a potential distributorship across 
a pan-European area. After months of negotiation, the heavy internal 
structure and de-centralized decision-making of the potential partner 
company started hindering the progress of the deal mostly driven by the 
need for proof of concept that Mendor was still lacking and the need for the 
potential partner to then assess the market potential. (IV13; IV19) In an 
industry with few large incumbents in fierce competition with each other 
over market share, with profits being threatened not only by the 
competitors’ actions but also by cost cutting programs of governments, the 
risk is extremely high for the large company to launch a product that has no 
proof of success or validation on the differentiating value of the offering. 
The UK of the pharmaceutical company decided to take that risk though and 
signed a distribution agreement with Mendor which opened the UK market 
to the product starting from April 2012. The UK is the first major market 
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where the product has been launched, almost 1.5 years after the start of the 
commercialization efforts. (IV13; IV16) 
After the successful launch in the UK, the interest from other viable partners 
has grown and currently Mendor is in the last stages of negotiating 
distribution covering most European markets and a potential expansion to 
other territories with a strong multinational company (IV13; IV16). 
7.1.2. Identified barriers to entry  
During its history, the company has faced significant barriers to entry. In 
this study, 71 different types of barriers to entry were identified based on the 
interviews with company key personnel and Finnish innovation support 
system actors. Many innovation support system actors described the 
challenges that Finnish biotechnology companies face as surprisingly 
similar even though the companies vary by industry, resources and other 
characteristics (IV4; IV7; IV9; IV11). 
The identified barriers are grouped according to the categories developed in 
chapter 2.2.1. (adapted from Karakaya 2002), in the following figure 5. This 
categorization from earlier research focuses on the source of the barrier to 
entry, indicating the focus on the incumbent perspective in the past research. 
This is evident also in the labeling of the groups as ‘advantages’ in 
comparison to ‘barriers’. What this categorization offers is a chance to link 
the case company barriers to entry to the same categorization as the 
identified theoretical barriers to entry and also presents the groups of 
barriers linked temporally to different stages of the company’s market entry 
efforts. The first category, the profit expectations of the entrants defines the 
answer to the market entry decision – whether the company will deem the 
market lucrative enough to seek entry. The second category, the financial 
requirements/cost of entry should act as a decision point for the company in 
assessing whether the company will have the required financial resources 
needed in market entry. If the company decides to move beyond this second 
decision point, it will next face the specific barriers rising from the 
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incumbents and its own characteristics and resources. Only once the 
company would start its selling efforts, it would come face to face with the 
customer/market-based barriers. The industry characteristics will affect the 
process at each step of market entry.  
In reality, the categories of barriers to entry are strongly intertwined and a 
company is likely to at least have indications of the barriers at each stage. 
Still, in Mendor’s case, many of the barriers to entry, especially linked to 
the customer/market based barriers were not anticipated to pose such 
barriers as they proved to be – a learning that only became evident once the 
company had already made the entry decision and committed resources to 
market entry (IV13). Thus, the temporal presentation of the categories does 
serve as a presentation that some barriers to entry, and especially their 
severity, could only be judged much beyond the entry decision. 
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Figure 5 Barriers to entry in Mendor Oy 
(Complete list with 
references provided 
in Appendix 2)
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After the identifying what barriers to entry exist for a small company 
seeking to enter a highly regulated market, the next point of interest is how 
the small company can tackle these barriers to entry with limited resources, 
according to the main research question of this study. The categorization 
that has been adapted from Karakaya (2002) is based on earlier research that 
has strongly focused on the incumbents’ position and in the creation of the 
barriers to entry for deterring new competition. For this reason the 
categorization is not a sufficient starting point for studying the entrant’s 
potential to tackle the barriers to entry to gain entry. To achieve this end, we 
have to study the challenges posed by the barriers to entry from the entrant’s 
perspective rather than solely discussing the sources for the existence of 
these barriers.  
Thus, to be able to answer the second piece of the main research question - 
how a small-scale de novo entrant such as Mendor can tackle these 
identified barriers to entry, the barriers to entry are studied from a different 
perspective. In the next section, the identified 71 barriers to entry are 
grouped according to the types of challenges that their existence has created 
for Mendor. As will be discussed in the next section based on Mendor’s 
experiences, most barriers to entry and especially their severity could not be 
reliably assessed before the market entry decision was made. Due to a 
combination of factors, the company had unrealistic expectations 
concerning the time to market leading to difficulties in forecasting their 
sales development which in turn led to challenges in managing stakeholder 
relations and expectations as the company needed to continually revise their 
forecasts once they gained more understanding of the market, the barriers, 
and the bureaucracy and conservatism of the market.  
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7.2. The challenges for Mendor Oy 
In this section, the four main groups of challenges created by the identified 
71 barriers to entry are discussed. The challenges for Mendor can be 
summarized in four groups: time, experience, sales and financial challenges.  
7.2.1. Time 
The first group of challenges is related to time to market and is an 
overarching challenge that is affected by all barriers to entry. As discussed 
in chapter 8.1.1, Mendor received the CE mark for its blood glucose meter 
already in late 2010, marking a European wide sales permission for the 
product. Despite its best efforts, the first significant distribution agreements, 
opening the UK market did not happen until some 1.5 years later. (IV1; 
IV3) In this section the slowness of a regulated market and other barriers 
directly related to time are discussed.  
 
Figure 6 Barriers related to time 
 
Time is a critical factor in market entry. Not only does regulation cause 
additional work but also creates the general slowness to the market due to 
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the required approvals and due to the heavy processes of other actors (e.g. 
notified body, quality systems, audits etc.).  This time factor is also essential 
from the perspective of the economy and the market as the market changes 
very slowly. (IV1) 
Time as a factor has affected Mendor’s operations from the very start. The 
medical industry is very much characterized by slowness due to heavy 
regulated processes within all the major actors, their internal and external 
processes (IV1; IV2; IV3; IV9; IV17; IV18; IV21). The regulation linked to 
the very long product lifecycles, low rate of technology change, slowed 
market growth, and packed product space with fierce competition between 
the few large incumbents, the market has become highly consolidated and 
focused on rather maintaining the status quo than moving forward (IV3; 
IV16; IV18). The key incumbents have been the same in the market for 
decades and have invested significant amount of money and other resources 
into building relationships, brands and patent portfolios while strengthening 
their position in the market. (IV3; IV4; IV6; IV12; IV24) These incumbents 
have massive production volumes and with 80-85 % of the whole market 
being shared between these four key players, they have strong control over 
the industry value chains and have achieved both horizontal and vertical 
integration over time (IV13; IV16). The time it takes for a new entrant to 
build the needed operations and form the relations to its stakeholders will 
require a long time. Even with time, breaking the long lived relationships 
and other bonds the incumbents have built to suppliers, regulatory bodies, 
customers and other industry actors will pose a significant challenge. (IV6; 
IV16; IV21; IV23) 
“The incentives for innovation are few in regulated industries – due to the 
slowness of the market, it takes forever to achieve anything and in addition 
all the current structures serve the status quo and thus the incumbents. 
Challenge is to stay above the water long enough to get there…” (IV13) 
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 To be able to obtain and keep the needed regulatory approvals for the sales 
of medical products, companies need to follow certain standard 
requirements starting from the correct documentation of its research and 
development projects and go through extensive trials to validate the safety 
and efficacy of the product and its compliance with the standard 
requirements (IV1; IV22; IV24). One major challenge relating to the 
research and development of Mendor’s innovative device was finding the 
fine line between compliance with standard requirements and being able to 
differentiate from current products available in the market (IV1). 
Regulations are built on the specifications of the current products and large 
incumbents are working heavily through their political relationships and 
through lobbying to be able to standardize their technologies and to create 
new requirements that will be hard for the entrants to comply with (IV13; 
IV22; IV23, IV24). The strict standard requirements based on current 
technologies decrease incentives to innovative as the risks involved in 
investing millions into the development of a new product without assurance 
that it will be able to obtain the needed approvals, at least in due time before 
the company funding runs out, is too great for many small companies and 
thus the innovations in the market have mostly been on other fronts than 
technology (IV13; IV16). The furthest form of entry deterrence through 
regulatory requirements is when certain incumbents have successfully 
managed to introduce requirements that correspond to their patents, creating 
a restrictive situation for any entrants for the time being with a specific 
technology (IV24). Any changes to the regulation requirements will take a 
very long time and as influence small companies will often be out of reach 
to changing the standards, they will often have no other option than to 
comply (IV11; IV20).  
In addition to the approvals for the production and sale of the product, a 
process that usually takes for about a year in relation to health technologies, 
the company also needed to obtain reimbursement for its device in the 
markets it was targeting (IV8; IV16). Whereas the CE mark is granted as a 
sales permission for the whole EU area, the reimbursement systems vary by 
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country dependent on the structure of the health care systems. In some 
countries the application for reimbursement is only possible once in every 
quarter or even worse, once each year, and the processing time often takes 
several months. (IV16) Directly after receiving the CE mark for the product, 
Mendor started investigating the reimbursement systems in key EU markets 
and soon understood that it getting approved into the list of reimbursed 
products will require many resources due to the long lists of requirements 
dependent on the country, always required in the local language. The 
company needed to target those countries first where it considered the 
reimbursement applications would be less stringent but due to lack of robust 
data to show any differentiating value for the product, the product was 
granted the price level of generic products. (IV13; IV16; IV23) 
In countries such as in the company home market of Finland, the 
reimbursement of the product is linked to the public procurement of the 
products through tenders. The municipalities procure diabetes supplies 
approximately each 3-5 years based on criteria combining price and quality 
considerations. Due to the de-centralization of the key decision-makers, the 
companies willing to bid in tenders need to start working with several 
different municipality decision-makers long before the tender is published, 
to be able to influence the tender requirements in advance of its publication. 
The de-centralization creates many challenges for small companies with 
innovative offerings as the selling needs to be done from door to door and 
many different actors with different motives need to be convinced (IV4). 
The tender is generally published several months before the start of the new 
tender period but the ground work with the decision-makers needs to be 
done long before this time period. If the company is successful in the tender 
and gets chosen, they will be able to enter into an exclusive agreement for a 
period of years thus seeming as a lucrative option for generating sales. (IV1; 
IV1; IV6; IV9; IV12; IV20; IV21) Unfortunately, as Mendor came to find 
out, this type of a market requires massive resources and entails a fair 
amount of risk in case the tender outcome will not be successful for the 
company. The tendering criteria are not based on the definition of a need but 
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rather on pre-set specifications that are based on the current known 
offerings. Thus, the basic tender legislations requirement for unequivocal 
assessment criteria often leads to the drafting of criteria that does not take 
into account innovations. For instance Mendor’s integrated product has been 
excluded from bidding due to such compulsory requirements as having a 
separate vial for test strips even though the whole differentiating factor of 
the product is the integration of the separate components. (IV13; IV21)  
Even though Mendor seeks to educate the procurement committee well in 
advance of the drafting of the specifications, producing change in the 
procurement chain is very slow (IV21; IV23). In addition, the heavy 
lobbying from the incumbents will affect the interpretation of regulations 
and steer new regulations towards more favorable conditions for 
incumbents. The most influential discussions on practices are had between 
professionals but incumbents will also try to affect these discussions in 
advance. (IV4; IV6; IV7; IV9; IV12; IV22; IV23; IV24) 
In addition, once the tendering has been held for a respective tender period, 
the area in question is outside of sales potential for a number of years, thus 
making market penetration very difficult. (IV13; IV14; IV21; IV23 
Different government policies and legislations regulate the daily operations 
of the public stakeholders such as the people responsible for procurement 
also creating a direct link to the time they have available to spend on 
familiarizing themselves with a new product (IV13; IV21; IV23). 
As described in chapter 8.1.1, Mendor soon realized that it will be 
impossible for it to penetrate many markets at the same time given its small 
resources and decided to start searching for distribution partners. As the 
example of its negotiations with its UK partner described, due to the heavy 
processes of all the industry players, negotiating a significant contract in a 
regulated industry requires plenty of time and effort to be able to convince 
the potential partner to take the risk of launching a new product without 
extensive data on proof of concept, massive market research and experience 
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with the product to verify its market potential. (IV13; IV16) Even though 
the regulatory measures pose a significant time concern, the bureaucracy 
and slowness of the potential partners is an even more significant factor. 
Finding a credible partner, selling to them, negotiating with them and 
signing contracts with large pharmaceutical companies with multiple 
approval levels and hierarchical processes will consume a staggering 
amount of time in a crucial point of time while the company is struggling to 
stay alive as the R&D funding has run out. (IV16) 
There is also significant lag time in the market compared to a consumer 
product. The blood glucose monitoring industry has developed into a 
razorblade business model, where the suppliers will give out the devices 
free of charge and make their profit from the consumable test strips that are 
compatible only with specific devices. (IV13: IV16; IV18) Thus a 
significant up-front investment is needed to place the meters into the market 
which all will not end up in active use. Working through a distributor, the 
lag time can be anything from 9-12 months before the product will first 
move from the distributor’s warehouse into the hands of health care 
professionals, who will need to be trained by sales representatives before 
they can start handing out the devices to patients. (IV16)  
Due to the variety of challenges related to time discussed in this section, 
average time to break even with a new product in a regulated market is 
between 3-5 years and the product lifetime can last up to 10 years. Even 
though these numbers give an idea of the terrible slowness of the market 
once seeking entry, products can become good cash cows for a relative long 
period of time if entry will be successful. (IV16; MY18) Still, from the point 
of view of a small entrant, the time factor is critical in relation to market 
entry. Entry into this regulated industry is gruesome due to the heavy 
processes and structures and slow pace of the market but if the company 
manages to fight through the many barriers to entry and can stay above the 
water during the lengthy process of seeking entry, the market can offer a 
good return and a fairly defensive position. (IV1; IV16; IV18) 
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7.2.2. Experience  
The second group of challenges is related to the lack of experience in and of 
the market and refers mostly to the entrant’s characteristics. As became 
evident in the interviews, the knowledge of the market and the right skills in 
the company is a necessary precursor for success in an industry that is very 
difficult to enter in and even more difficult to compete in (IV2; IV4; IV9; 
IV16; IV18). 
As mentioned before in section 8.1.2, as a de novo entrant into a new 
industry, Mendor did not have previous experience on the industry but had 
to start its operations based on limited knowledge. The lack of experience in 
the industry is the defining factor for the challenges created by the barriers 
to entry related to experience.  
 
Figure 7 Barriers related to experience 
One of the first challenges related to experience marks the start of the 
company’s operations. As the company started developing a medical device, 
it had to construct an extensive quality system as one of the first steps in the 
company operations (IV13; IV20; IV23). The challenge is that lack of 
expertise can lead to longer term challenges as the company does not have 
the option to gain the required competences in peace (IV20), often leading 
to the construction of quality systems that rather constrain that support the 
company operations, prohibiting agility (IV24). The quality system does not 
only control the company’s R&D and other product related operations but 
also includes an extensive management system covering all functions of the 
company (IV22). Being able to construct processes that would serve the 
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company strategic goals already sets challenges for competence, 
understanding, financing and other resources. To be able to fulfill the 
needed requirements but leaving space for agility requires specific expertise 
which Mendor only learned later once the drawbacks of the initial system 
became evident in operations. (IV1) 
Due to the difficult competitive environment in the medical device industry, 
special skills are needed to succeed. Attracting experts who have experience 
in the industry was an important step for Mendor in starting to understand 
where it strategic focus should lie and where its limited resources will be in 
the best possible use (IV13; IV18; IV23). Pressured by the short term need 
for sales, Mendor too has many times had to sacrifice its longer term 
strategy for its short term survival (IV1). Unfortunately inconsistency has 
caused some confusion within the company personnel and might have 
created some inefficiency in its operations (DOC4). Lack of deep market 
understanding also led the company to discard any strategies very quickly if 
they did not start producing results, lacking the understanding of the time 
that it takes to gain results in the slow market (IV18). Since finally starting 
to see its targeting strategy paying off with its distribution agreement with a 
large pharmaceutical company in the UK, the company has made the 
strategic consistency one of its key goals (IV1).  
Choosing the right partners and suppliers was a challenge for Mendor as the 
performance could not be assessed in advance and as a new comer to the 
industry, the company did not have the access to up to date industry 
knowledge. The accumulation of market understanding and growing the 
level of expertise has been a challenge also due to limited resources and the 
ability to attract top class industry experts who are few in the specific 
industry. (IV1; IV18) With the market knowledge available through the 
right expertise, the company could have been more realistic in its 
expectations of the time to market and the sales growth (IV3; IV18; IV19). 
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“Gaining access to information and to deep understanding of the market has 
been difficult due to resource constraints [time, money, and expertise] and 
many choices have had to be made knowing that there is a lot that we do not 
know. Many issues caused significant delays to original plans when they 
finally came apparent to us such as different market requirements for the 
device.” (IV1) 
The availability of the special skills in Finland has also been an issue. There 
is a great supply of technology experts but there is still lack of business 
skills. Finnish companies are often technology-driven but lack the 
understanding of strategy and internationalization. Without the skills 
enabling growth and expansion, the companies are often stuck in a small 
market. (IV2; IV4; IV6; IV9) The same challenges faced Mendor and 
pushed the company to seek expertise abroad. The most essential skill sets 
to succeed in such a market have been the expertise and experience in 
raising funding and international sales that are very hard to find in a 
technology driven country as Finland (IV1; IV2).  
Also due to the slowness of the market, learning and accumulation of 
competence takes a long time. As the time factor is a constant in the 
industry, it needs to be accepted. Seeking the right kind of expertise to the 
company is essential to success but also finding the right people will take 
time – this time constraint has to be accepted to avoid hiring the wrong 
people due to pressures on resources. (IV20)  
 
7.2.3. Sales 
The third group of challenges is connected to the barriers to achieving sales. 
Even though all barriers to entry deter the success in sales, the factors 
discussed in this section are directly related to the nature of purchasing in 
the industry. As discussed in section 8.2.1, the same key incumbents have 
operated in the market for decades and spent a significant amount of 
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resources to build relationships and other bonds with their customers that 
are very hard to break (IV3; IV4; IV6; IV12; IV24). In this section the 
challenges for sales in a regulated industry are discussed.  
 
 
Figure 8 Barriers related to sales 
The health care industry involves several different stakeholders with 
different objectives who are interested in the market outcomes unlike most 
consumer markets. The key stakeholders include actors such as influencers, 
deciders, patients, suppliers, providers, and payers who might all be separate 
organizations. (IV1; IV3; IV4; IV23) In addition to these actors, the whole 
society is interested in health care transactions (IV1; IV3; Kotler & al. 
2008). Regardless of how the responsibilities have been organized between 
the different stakeholders in a given country, the large number of 
stakeholders creates complexity and a major distortion to the market. 
Whereas in consumer markets the customer’s choice is driven by the 
perceived value of the offering, in health care the payer is often someone 
else than the end user of the product or the service (IV1; IV2; IV3; 
HKKLS09). The three key groups of stakeholders include the end users 
(individual patients), the payers (governmental/insurance budget or both) 
and health care professionals (nurses, doctors etc.) who all have different 
needs and objectives (IV1; IV2; IV3; IV21; IV23; HKKLS09). The degree 
of complexity within the stakeholder network reflects into the purchasing 
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process, creating challenges for sales and increased transactions costs for 
suppliers of the products such as Mendor who instead of a single decision-
maker unit need to balance the different motives of three different 
stakeholders in order to produce a sale.  
 
Figure 9 The key stakeholders in health care 
In reality, all the objectives of the different stakeholders are not considered 
in the purchase decision in similar proportions but the sale is the result of a 
multiple level process (IV4; IV14; IV23). In markets such as in the UK, the 
health care professionals, namely nurses are in a powerful position as 
gatekeepers, presenting the choices of products to the patients. The nurses 
will need to be convinced about the product to ensure they will share the 
information to their patients. A key restricting issue is the availability of the 
nurses for consultations, restrictions on the promotion of medical devices, 
and the strong loyalty towards their preferred products. As the key driving 
motive for the nurses is the improved treatment balanced with concerns for 
their own resources and time, often leading to conservatism towards new 
solutions that would require additional work even though they would bring 
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long-term savings. (IV13; IV16; IV21; IV23) The traditional blood glucose 
measurement logic has been practically the same for decades and all the 
generic devices follow the same logic thus requiring no extra work from the 
nurses learning the use of a new generic device or showing it to their 
patients. Even though one of the key selling points of the Mendor device is 
its ease-of-use, it is based on a different logic than the traditional meters and 
thus often requires some time to start with to get familiarized with the use of 
the product. Due to the constant lack of time, old hierarchies and 
bureaucracies present in the health care system, the actors are often resistant 
to new things. (IV13: IV16; IV21) 
Driven by cost concerns, the payers have started limiting the number of 
products available for the patients namely based on the price of the 
consumable test strips for the blood glucose meters. Even though the 
general reimbursement price is set in the UK on a national level, different 
areas are responsible for the health care costs and the reimbursed products 
locally. Thus in addition to the nurses, the de-centralized payers will need to 
be convinced of the differentiated added value of the product in relation to 
the plethora of other devices available. Especially with the current cost 
cutting pressures on national budgets, the main concern of the payers is the 
costs of treatment. Finally, the end users i.e. the patients need to be 
informed on the new device to encourage them to choose the new product 
over the current one they are using. The sale is produced after a long value 
chain; the payer has been convinced to allow the reimbursement of the new 
product in the area, the nurse has been trained on the device and convinced 
on the benefits of the device to recommend it to their patients, the patient 
will choose the product from the number of products their treating nurse 
will present to them, learn the use of the device, and be satisfied with the 
device to continue actively using the device then leading to test strip sales 
from pharmacies. (IV1; IV3; IV 16) These test strip sales are the defining 
sale within the value chain. As described earlier in section 7.2.1., a 
significant up-front investment is made depending on a razorblade business 
model where the meters are placed to the market free of charge in order to 
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produce the sales of compatible consumables, the strips for testing. After the 
initial sales to stock the value chain, reorders will only be produced if the 
defining sales events will take place.  
  
 
Figure 10 The sales flow in the UK 
The markets operating on tendering such as Finland entail at least as many 
stakeholders but a different type of purchasing mechanism. As described in 
earlier sections, the products for purchase are selected based on preset 
tender criteria, combining price and quality considerations. The objective of 
the tender legislation is to use objective measures in the purchases and to 
increase transparency in public procurement decisions (IV1; IV21; IV23). 
Even though the basic principle of tendering is unbiased, the public 
procurement procedures have developed towards structures based on risk 
aversion even at the cost of the quality of the procured solution, with the 
procurer seeking safety balanced with up-front cost considerations first and 
foremost (IV1; IV14; IV23). Combining the regulation present in the 
medical field with the bureaucratic and hierarchical practices and operations 
of the public procurement offices, the system produces immense risk 
aversion behavior. The procurers will rather stick to the same old solutions 
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than take the risk of choosing something different even if the benefits would 
be greater to the patients. (IV1; IV12; IV21; IV23) 
Even though the regulatory approvals guarantee the same level of safety and 
efficacy for the new device, validating the delivery ability and scalability of 
the new supplier’s offering poses a risk that the public procurers are often 
not willing to take (IV1; IV14). To mitigate the risk, building credibility 
becomes very important in a regulated industry. In many consumer 
industries being a start-up company is a good thing but in this industry there 
is little chance in entering a market without proper infrastructure in place – 
even the regulation requires for certain resources and functions to be in 
place. Size is one indicator of credibility but professionalism is even more 
important. Credibility is not only required by customers but also investors, 
suppliers and the whole network of stakeholders. (IV6; IV18; IV19) 
For a company commercializing innovations, gaining credibility creates a 
chicken and egg situation as the product will not be chosen before there are 
credible references but the references are difficult to gain in the difficult and 
bureaucratic home market (IV12). Due to the conservatism and bureaucracy 
present in the home market, Finnish companies need to go abroad to get 
cash flow where potential partners will ask for references and find it 
suspicious that the company could not succeed in its home market (IV9; 
IV10; IV12; IV13; IV20). This leads to very weak home market support for 
internationalizing companies.  
The main problem is the level of expertise and knowledge within the 
procurement committee (IV8; IV9; IV12; IV14; IV21; IV23). The people 
responsible for the tender criteria do not necessarily understand the need for 
which they are purchasing or the meaning of the tender requirements to the 
patient or the treatment.  
“Often the same people are responsible for purchasing independent of 
whether the procurement is for food, socks or medical devices.” (IV1)  
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Thus tender criteria are often based on a long list of clinically irrelevant 
product specifications that do not improve the quality of the treatment or the 
value of the solution to the patient (IV8; IV21; IV23). Even though the 
procurement directives are meant to increase transparency and equality in 
procurement the wrongful interpretations made by the people responsible 
for the tendering criteria lead to favoring the old suppliers (IV9; IV23). The 
regulation itself is not a problem and is naturally needed to ensure the safety 
and efficacy of the medical solutions but the wrongful interpretations and 
illusions linked to the regulations are creating many challenges (IV23).  
Often the practices in public procurement are justified based on fears and 
wrongful beliefs caused by the serious lack of professionalism and expertise 
in public procurement (IV1; IV8; IV9; IV12; IV14). The people responsible 
for procurement often believe that by setting strict requirements on the 
specifications of the product, they will be considered professional even 
though it often leads to the procurement of products that fit the preset 
specifications that are made times even fully derived from earlier tender 
specifications or from product specifications of products that are currently 
being supplied. This procurement based on specifications rather than on the 
actual need may many times lead to worse solutions being procured when 
considering the actual need, in the case of diabetes supplies, improved 
treatment outcomes, that is not based on certain product specifications. 
(IV12; IV14; IV23) Expert opinions are only rarely listened to in tenders or 
their weight in the total assessment criteria is very low. Then again, without 
having a wider group of expert opinions listened to, the biases of certain 
experts might lead to biased opinions. (IV23)  
Another problematic issue relating to the structure of public purchasing is 
the focus on up-front costs instead of the total long-term costs. In the current 
system, working devices that are in use with patients are changed every 2-3 
years regardless of the patients’ preference or the effect on their treatment 
(IV23). Not only do the patients have to endure constant changes in their 
treatment but also the nurses have to spend a considerable amount of time 
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and other resources seeing each patient in order to switch them over to a 
new device in case the product being currently used is not in the list of 
selected products for the next tender period. In addition to the strain caused 
for the end users and the health care professionals, the resources being spent 
on the operating of the tender processes are massive, all leading to a huge 
waste of resources. (IV6; IV9; IV12; IV20; IV23) As significant switching 
costs are present, it can easily lead to favoring of current suppliers only to 
avoid having to go through the trouble caused by changes in the system 
(IV13; IV23).  
Total lifetime costs are tricky concepts in public procurement for several 
reasons. Firstly, the municipality budgets are usually set up for a yearly 
period, driving the concerns to the short-term costs. Secondly, the budgets 
are usually separated for the costs of supplies, the costs of treatment and 
also for costs of investments and repairs. The dual structure does not 
encourage the considerations on the major increase in treatment costs 
caused by complications due to suboptimal treatment induced by the lack of 
concern for the patients’ preference in relation to their treatment. (IV12) 
Short-term cost concerns also drive the tender criteria with the weight of the 
price often being some 70 % of the whole assessment criteria, only 
considering the up-front costs of the supplies, even though, as discussed in 
section 8.1.1., better treatment could prevent over half of the currently 
occurring diabetes complications that count up to over half of the total costs 
of diabetes whereas the costs of medical supplies only are approximately 3 
%. (IV23; DOC3) 
It should be understood though that it is difficult for an individual to start 
taking more risk in their purchasing decisions as long as all the incentive 
systems on the public level are based on risk aversion and not on ensuring 
the best possible solutions for use. Due to the high risk involved in health 
care procurement based on the length of the contract, high value of the 
purchase and the dependency on the procured solutions, the procurers often 
seek safety instead of the best possible solution. The incumbents also know 
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how to use the fear to their benefit and are not afraid of law suits involving 
any processes with unfavorable outcomes to them.  
“The biggest fear in procurement is not that the best solution would not get 
purchased but the possible law suits” (IV12) 
The public procurement directives do allow purchases outside the tender 
agreement in a yearly value below a certain threshold but the procurement 
people are often unknowledgeable about the possibilities beyond the tender 
agreements. This is again related to the lack of expertise and to the false 
interpretations made on the regulations, leading to avoidance of anything 
out of the normal operating procedures in the procurement chain. (IV12; 
IV13; IV14; IV21; IV23) 
As the description above shows, much effort is needed in overcoming the 
barriers created by the complexity of the multiple stakeholders and the 
conservative and bureaucratic nature of the public procurement processes. 
There are strong, old hierarchies present in the health care market with the 
actors unwilling to change the structures. This leads to significant 
implications to innovation sales in this regulated market.  
 
7.2.4. Financial 
The final group of challenges deriving from the many barriers to entry 
relates to the financial resources needed in market entry into a regulated 
market. The industry is heavily consolidated with only a few large 
incumbents that, in the pressures of cost cutting from the national health 
care budgets, are fiercely competing over maintaining their market share 
and the huge profit margins. They have massive organizations in place to 
support the massive profitability and are very defensive of their market 
position. (IV3; IV16)  In addition, they have the money, the power and the 
control to outspend, outshout, and outprice the new entrants, increasing the 
severity of many of the challenges (IV3; IV16). As a manufacturing 
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company, production capabilities and value networks need to be in place 
before entry, increasing the sunk costs and raising the investment risk 
related to entry. (IV2; IV19) The financial challenges of entry are discussed 
in this section.  
 
Figure 11 Barriers related to financials 
The costs of entry to the market are significant in a regulated industry. 
Blood glucose meters are fairly complex devices combining 
electrochemistry, software and other technologies creating challenges for 
R&D which is often costly with such devices (IV18). Once the product is 
ready in compliance with the standard specifications and the project 
documentation complies with the heavy demands, the next costly hurdle is 
gaining the required regulatory approvals including costly trials and other 
data to prove the safety and efficacy of the new product (IV22; IV24). As 
discussed in section 8.2.1., the regulatory requirements are based on current 
technologies and thus there is always risk involved in innovating (IV13; 
IV22; IV23, IV24). In addition, changes in the standard requirements can 
swipe out a number of products from the market, leading to mass paralysis 
already out of fear of changes (IV1; IV2; IV16; IV20). These factors raise 
the uncertainty of entry significantly, directly affecting the investment risk 
(IV1; IV2; IV16; IV20) In parallel, the company needs to build up their 
supplier network, production capabilities and prepare for scaling up the 
business in preparation for the start of sales (IV13; IV19).  
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The heavy need for cash does not end once the operations have been set up 
for the start of sales. Taking the product to market is significantly more 
costly than R&D. For Mendor, some 20-30 % of the total financing needs 
were spent on getting the product ready and approved but between 70-80 % 
are estimated to go into entering the market (IV19). This is no anomaly in 
the field of medical technologies (IV1; IV2; IV16; IV18; IV20).  
“In the medical field, whereas 1x is needed for R&D, another 10x is needed 
for market entry – but a 100x for international growth!” (IV11) 
Huge finances and capital are needed for building the operations even 
before entry which in turn ties up significant amount of capital even before 
the regulatory approvals and first sales, making the uncertainty of entry a 
significant issue in terms of financing as the sunk costs are substantial (IV1; 
IV2). Still, the majority of the costs are related to the major up-front 
investment needed for success in the market.  
Due to the heavy marketing and sales intensity of the market, relating to a 
great number of different stakeholders and to the significant chain of actors 
between the end user and the company, heavy marketing and sales 
investments are needed to drive success. The different objectives of the 
stakeholders require for convincing data which is also very costly to 
produce, including robust market research in the target markets. Due to the 
many difficulties related to selling in the industry, as discussed in the 
previous section on challenges for sales created by the barriers to entry, 
there is a need not only for massive sales muscle in terms of reach but in 
terms of the required skill level of the sales people. In order to be able to 
succeed in sales, highly specialized and experienced sales people are 
necessary, who are able to work with the different types of stakeholders 
with different needs. Finding the sales people who are skillful enough is one 
challenge but bearing the heavy costs of a specialized sales force is another. 
In addition to the investment in success through marketing and sales, a 
significant up-front investment needs to be borne due to the nature of the 
85 
 
market. As described in earlier sections (8.1.2. and 8.1.3.), the company 
needs to make a significant investment up-front by placing the blood 
glucose meters into the market free of charge, with a significant lead time 
before the sales of the consumables will follow due to the slowness and lag 
times created by the chain of stakeholders characteristic to the market. (IV3; 
IV16) 
As estimation is that the financial overhead caused by the regulated market 
brings is approximately 60 % in comparison to less regulated markets, 
posing challenges for financing of the operations (IV13). When the time 
factor is taking into account, the challenge becomes even more crucial – 
how will the company finance its operations and stay above the water 
during the significant lag time it takes to produce sales in the market (IV9; 
IV17; IV19). In many cases, small companies do not have the money it 
takes to succeed. The typical development chain of medical innovations and 
their funding is presented in Appendix 3.   
Mendor was able to raise financing for its R&D efforts with a combination 
of public and private financing. Using Tekes’ loans and grants for R&D and 
the funds the company had secured from private investors after its win in a 
Venture Cup competition, it managed to get the product ready and 
approved. Once the R&D phase was over, the company found it 
significantly harder to find financing for its operations. They noticed that 
within the public investors there is an illusion that after the product is ready, 
funding will become available from private sources. In reality there is a big 
gap as the private investors often require proof of the concept and a level of 
cash flow before they become interested. As described in section 8.2.1, the 
slowness of the market affects the accumulation of the both proofs 
significantly and the company easily slips into a vicious circle in case the 
time between R&D financing and commercializing financing is long. The 
company will not have the money it needs for its commercialization efforts 
that are required to find suitable partners in different markets all while the 
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private investors are waiting for verification of the market potential before 
they invest in the company’s market entry efforts.  
Mendor’s struggle in securing further financing after the R&D phase is a 
common challenge with many Finnish companies (IV1; IV2; IV5; IV8; IV9; 
IV17). The public support system offers plenty of funding for R&D but the 
companies are left alone to commercialize (IV14). TEKES is one of the only 
public funding agencies that offer any support for internationalization of 
companies. As such, the amount of financing available is only a very small 
fraction of the agency’s R&D support as shown in the figure 13 below. 
 
Figure 12 TEKES funding for R&D and internationalization of companies  
(DOC 7) 
"The lack of money in Finland for commercialization is insane. At the same 
time as R&D funding is offered to all companies, including large companies 
with massive profitability, many small companies with great potential go 
under as their cash runs out" (IV13) 
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Often the lack of public financing for operations after the R&D phase is 
justified by reference to EU anti-trust policies (IV4; IV7; IV8; IV9; IV13; 
IV17; IV19). When interrogated about the level of restrictions, it was 
evident that the legislation does not forbid all public support for activities 
related to commercialization but rather that different interpretations of the 
legislation make it easier to offer support for R&D (IV4; IV7; IV8; IV9; 
IV17). For instance, public funding could be used to support the 
preparations of market entry, including the search for partners and market 
research. Currently these funding options are scarcely used.  
“The support for commercialization is so poor not because it would not be 
possible but because people interpret the regulations as black and white, 
and do not really understand what is possible and what is not. Explaining 
the lack of public support for commercialization with anti-trust issues is 
flawed as the regulation itself already disturbs the market as do any public 
grants given to large companies turning a huge profit.” (IV13) 
The amount of private venture capital is very little currently in the 
biotechnology field as many financing portfolios have quit in the recent 
years and new ones have not been born to fill the gap (IV11; IV17; IV20). 
The remote location also affects the amount of money available for Finnish 
companies as Finland is often considered too remote for financing from the 
US or other large venture capital markets, both geographically and 
culturally (IV8; IV9; IV19). Even though the situation has improved in the 
recent years, there are still too little risk investors in Finland and companies 
need to go abroad to raise funding which in turn requires more resources 
and skills (IV19).  
Mendor has also faced challenges linked to managing the different 
expectations of its stakeholders, including its investors. Many investors 
often have unrealistic expectations on the returns and the time it takes in the 
medical device market in comparison with consumer market returns that 
they more familiar with (IV13). The complexity of the market with different 
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stakeholders, high sunk costs, the uncertainty of entry and the small number 
of investors who are knowledgeable about the market decreases the 
motivation to invest to start with (IV17; IV19). Managing the expectations 
of the investors has been a challenge for Mendor as some of its investors are 
more patient with their investment than others (IV13). This challenge has 
also been strongly linked to the difficulties the company has faced in 
forecasting the amount of money needed before the company will break 
even and the time it will take before the company would become profitable, 
related to the lack of deep market understanding and too much optimism 
when assessing the time to market as discussed in sections 8.2.1. and 8.2.2. 
The changing estimations from the company to its key stakeholders such as 
the investors or the suppliers relating to sales forecasts have been a major 
challenge for the company in maintaining its credibility (IV18; IV19). As 
many companies in the field, also Mendor was too optimistic concerning the 
time and the amount of resources needed to enter the market (IV7; IV9; 
IV11; IV18; IV19; IV20).  
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7.3. Tackling the barriers to entry 
After the description of the four major groups of challenges to Mendor 
caused by the barriers to entry in the market – time, experience, sales and 
financial – the focus will now be on the chances of the small company to 
tackle the identified barriers to entry. This chapter will follow a similar 
structure as the previous section in the discussion on tackling the identified 
barriers to entry, while answering the second piece of the first research 
questions on how small companies with limited resources can tackle the 
barriers to entry in regulated industries.  
 
7.3.1. Time 
As the slowness of the market is one major industry defining characteristic, 
an individual company has little chance on affecting the time but has to 
accept the time factor. What a company can do is to mitigate delays by 
thorough preparation and focus.  
First and foremost, the company should seek to investigate the potential 
barriers to entry in different target markets as the first steps of existence, to 
be able to make an enlightened decision on market entry and the key 
markets to target (IV9). Choosing the right target markets is paramount to 
success and the focus should be decided already in the very start to be able 
to take the regulatory requirements of each of the key markets into account 
already in the product development (IV7; IV11; IV13). The product should 
be designed keeping in mind the standard requirements as the approval 
process will be much easier if similar technologies are already in the market 
(IV11) and sometimes waiting for a similar technology to first get approved 
can be a strategic choice to avoid the heavy, costly and lengthy premarket 
acceptance process (IV22). Learning from the competitors’ products can be 
useful to a certain extent, to save own strained resources. Mendor used this 
tactic especially in relation to its product materials, including user manuals 
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that heavily controlled by different directives in terms of their contents. The 
imitation needs to be balanced to avoid becoming too similar with the 
generic products already out in the market leading into pure pricing 
competition that the incumbents with their absolute cost advantage would 
most likely win. (IV13)  
Entrepreneurs should understand to let go of the Finnish tendency of 
developing the products too far on their own before linking with the outside 
world (IV7). The company can gain many benefits from early collaboration 
with regulatory bodies and other industry actors, already sharing and 
gaining information during the development process. Often in technology 
focused companies there tends to be an element of naivety and stubbornness 
with entrepreneurs wanting to go too far on their own (IV17; IV18). 
Companies also often falsely rely on the uniqueness of their product but an 
extensive competitive analysis needs to be made in advance, especially in 
regulated markets where patents and licenses to operate are important 
considerations (IV7). In addition, the preparations for sales should be started 
already well in advance of the regulatory approvals to inform the 
stakeholders of the new product about to be launched in the market (IV20).  
The selecting of the right markets to target is an essential consideration and 
can even define the company’s future (IV7; IV9; IV16; IV20). This decision 
should be made based on proper market research and the company should 
focus on finding appropriate companies in those target markets who can 
give the financial or expertise leverage the small company will need (IV16). 
If the target markets are not selected early enough, the company will end up 
wasting time and resources and potentially lose the early sales that would 
have kept the company financially afloat (IV7). The focus should be on 
markets that will allow entry fast – the size of the market is not the only 
viable consideration but other considerations such as the organization of the 
purchasing infrastructure is essential (IV20). Often, due to locality, it is 
easier to start with nearby markets which unfortunately was not the case for 
91 
 
Mendor that is still struggling to create traction in the home market and 
needed to go abroad in order to produce sales (IV13).  
Companies should understand that market entry takes up a lot of resources 
and a company should rather focus on specific markets at a time (IV9; 
IV20). Pressured by the need to generate cash flow in the short-term to keep 
the company alive, Mendor was targeting different local distribution 
companies without clear considerations on the suitability of the partner or 
the resources that need to be dedicated in the longer-term to manage the 
accounts in different countries with several different partners. Looking back, 
things could have been done much more efficiently by only focusing the 
resources on a few key issues - clearly and strictly targeting certain areas 
and not wasting the small resources by going too wide. (IV15) Finding the 
markets where the prices are still on an acceptable level and by targeting 
rather a niche category of suitable patients for the specific device to start 
with would have helped in keeping the internal costs done. After realizing 
the amount of resources being tied into producing sales from a number of 
different small areas through distributors who were not experienced or 
resourced enough to be successful in the markets, the company changed its 
strategic focus on realized that the only way to gain success is to find the 
right partners and focus all the company resources in finding those key 
partnerships. (IV15; IV16; IV18) 
 
7.3.2. Experience 
To tackle the challenges posed by experience related barriers, companies 
should focus on defining the key skills needed in the industry and on finding 
those key skills as early on as possible (IV9; IV18). The skill sets needed in 
different industries are often different (IV17). Experienced people who 
know the market should be consulted even before making the market entry 
decision. Even though the expertise will be a significant cost for the 
company in the early stages, it will often be an investment necessary to 
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make rather earlier than later. Otherwise the company will end up making 
wrong decisions and wasting time, money and resources on the market, only 
to realize later that they need these experts to succeed. All the expertise does 
not have to be in-house but outside consultants or other experts can also be 
used (IV7; IV22).  Understanding the market better becomes critical and can 
save a lot of pain as the company can make the right decisions earlier on 
(IV15; IV18).  
“Defining the needed skills and competences and then making sure that 
these abilities are in the company is essential - good people are only needed 
in minority but without them nothing works” (IV20) 
 
To be able to attract these industry experts, small companies should have a 
really interesting idea which Mendor successfully managed to achieve. The 
larger incumbents in the market have earlier on tried to develop integrated 
products without much success in the area and thus Mendor’s product is 
interesting for industry experts. Networks and relationships are essential in 
finding these key skills and incubators are good routes to these contacts. 
Networks and relationships also help in building trust and creating industry 
connections and a small company should try to find people to the company, 
or at least to serve as board members or advisors, who have strong networks 
in the industry (IV7; IV10; IV17). The personal networks of the company’s 
investors also opened doors to Mendor in the start. (IV15)  
Another thing that the company learned was that an international team is 
essential for international market entry and Finnish people rarely have the 
needed skills in international sales (IV15). Finnish people often are very 
skilled in the technology front but lack sales and marketing skills (IV4; IV7; 
IV9; IV10; IV15; IV17; IV19; IV20). A symptom of the lacking business 
skills is that Finnish people often try to go technology first without 
understanding that the customer need is what should be communicated 
(IV10). A top class international sales person is a must for a company 
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reaching to international markets – even though usually very expensive, it is 
essential (IV15).  
The experience can also be gained through partnerships. Through partners, a 
small company can get access to competences and resources that can grow 
for decades. Key partners can also be willing to invest their own resources 
into a new company if they see the potential. The relationships and the 
bonds created between partners are very important and even in case of 
problems the partner would often be willing to offer their help. (IV20) After 
taking their targeted approach to seeking partners, Mendor has been able 
secure a partnership with a large pharmaceutical company who can leverage 
also Mendor’s need for expertise and other support.  
7.3.3. Sales 
The relationships and the reference value that credible partners can offer 
should not be underestimated in relation to tackling the barriers related to 
sales. Not only will a carefully selected partner have the resources needed to 
penetrate the market, they will also serve as references to other stakeholders, 
including other customers (IV9; IV15; IV19). Thus also the key to the sales 
challenges is often in finding a suitable partner for each of the key target 
markets. The key driver should be partners who are able to offer what you 
are missing in terms of resources and expertise in the market (IV16; IV18). 
Choosing the right partner is an important consideration and should be 
based on a combination of resources, drive, channels and reach – without 
forgetting personal chemistry (IV4; IV9; IV15). 
A good partnership does not produce itself though but sales skills are 
essential in being able to find and develop great partnerships. Even a good 
product does not sell itself even though this illusion still seems to be alive at 
least in Finland (IV7). Linking back to the last section on expertise, strong 
international sales skills truly are necessary to be able to succeed in the 
difficult regulated business (IV15; IV16; IV20).  
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Finnish companies also often are misled into believing that a Finnish name 
would be of value in international markets which is often not the case. This 
misbelief is often driven by patriotism and nostalgia. In reality, a local or a 
global brand and market entry with a locally well-known partner is very 
important to succeed (IV7).  
To succeed in competition with decreasing prices and increasing 
restrictions, companies should try and prove savings for the whole health 
care system. These types of wholesome analyses are often impossible to 
conduct for a small actor but working through a larger partner these could 
be produced. In some cases that still might not be enough as there are often 
separate budgets for treatment and supplies (IV8).  
The success in tackling the barriers to entry relating to sales are in many 
cases structural and dependent on the characteristics of the customers. A 
small company can through partnering with the right partners accumulate 
the best resources possible in terms of expertise and reach to succeed with 
the complex sales to customer organizations. (IV15; IV16)  
A sustainable competitive advantage should be based on highly 
differentiated technologies able to generate cost reductions for the health 
care payers – the most effective strategy could be based on the highest 
health impacts for the patients and thus the highest potential long-run 
savings for the payers. (IV16; IV23) To be able to arrive to this point in 
time, significant changes are needed also in the customer organizations.  
 
7.3.4. Financial 
To tackle the financial challenges, having the right skills in the organization 
is as essential as in succeeding in sales (IV19). In raising capital, it is crucial 
to have a compelling presentation on the reasons why the company will be 
able to make an exit or become profitable itself - certain skills are needed to 
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sell the idea to assure the investors (IV15; IV19). The CEO of the company 
is an important person and needs to be a good motivator, both towards the 
investors and the potential partners, with a strong drive to take the company 
forward (IV19).  
The chances for financing can be increased with a credible business plan 
and a strong sales pitch. The team is very important to investors, in terms of 
the right expertise, networks, motivations, drive, a good story. (IV8) Still, 
the problem often becomes the need for proof of concept which takes a long 
time in a regulated industry. The same as Mendor, many companies will 
struggle in raising more funding after the R&D phase. (IV1; IV13; IV19)   
The huge investment need necessary in the market can be tackled by sharing 
the risk with investors, local governments, customers and other partners. 
Focus on target markets while trying to keep the internal costs down should 
be a number one priority for the company. Finding the specific market that 
do not require such significant investments and offer a quicker return should 
be strictly targeted. (IV16) 
 
7.4. Government and innovation support system role 
As the governments and societies as a whole are important stakeholders in 
health care market outcomes, the role of the government and the public 
innovations support actors is also briefly discussed. As an additional 
research question in this study, the role of the government as a supporter of 
new company birth and growth is examined. In the health care industry, the 
question is fairly complex as the government and its suborganizations are on 
the other hand the customers of the company through the municipalities and 
their health care supply procurement and on the other they represent the 
public innovation support actors such as the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation (Tekes). In this section, potential for the 
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government to influence the barriers to entry in health care markets is 
discussed briefly.  
As discussed in chapter 2.1., the governments and societies as a whole 
benefit from innovation and should seek to promote the birth and growth of 
new companies. This issue is even more apparent in the health care sector, 
where the outcomes of treatment are directly related to the social welfare of 
the society and thus the supporting of local innovation in the health care 
sector should lead to increased total welfare, also through the direct 
company taxes and jobs created. In addition, to be able to repair the current 
export gap of over 20 million euros caused by the global economic 
environment, Finland needs new companies generating growth. (IV9).  
According to Blees et al. (2003), governments that want to stimulate 
entrepreneurship and competition should take into account that some 
barriers can only be influenced in the long run through public policy 
decisions. Many of the challenges faced by Mendor are specifically related 
to the structures that the government can improve.  
For instance, in relation to Mendor’s financial challenges, raising financing 
after the initial R&D phase is very difficult in Finland due to the low 
availability of funds. The public funding is strongly focused on R&D and 
invention support even though the real financing needs start only after the 
product is ready. The fear is that many good inventions will be missed as 
they will die as they will not have the sufficient funds required in market 
entry (IV19) and end up missing time, energy and business ideas in Finland 
as the support system gets weaker and weaker once the company develops 
towards potential growth (IV17). Currently, the public financing also seems 
to be geared towards certain “trend” industries at a given time, giving the 
funding a strongly present focus. Instead of focusing in the industries of 
today, public funding should be applicable to a wide variety of industries as 
the future industries cannot be defined today.  
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“You cannot know in which field the next Angry Birds will come from and 
thus the focus of financing should be on a wide range of industries” (IV17) 
There is also considerable fragmentation in the field with of innovation 
support system whereas companies should be serviced as a whole and not in 
separate pieces. The cooperation between the actors should be increased and 
the number of actors should rather be decreased to ensure efficiency (IV6; 
IV7; IV8; IV9; IV11; IV12; IV17; IV19). The current support system, 
especially related to financing, does not consider the industry specific 
challenges that companies face. Due to the nature of the industries, the 
financial needs are not the same in for instance for a consumer software 
business and a regulated manufacturing industry. The public support system 
should recognize the different needs. (IV19) 
 
As the challenges related to sales for Mendor showed, the bureaucracy and 
current conservative practices in public procurement focusing on 
procurement by specifications and not on the need are major barriers to 
entry for innovations, especially in the health care sector (IV1; IV6; IV9; 
IV12; IV20; IV21). As the current structures are very heavy and often lead 
into wasting of resources and into false cost savings as the focus is only on 
short term costs instead of the total lifetime costs or on the treatment 
outcomes (e.g. IV5, IV8). 
As one of the actions of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, an 
innovation policy has been developed, with the main goal of creating an 
innovation friendly environment to Finland to support new company birth 
and growth (IV12). The policy identified public procurement as one of the 
key chances of influencing the demand conditions locally and seeks to 
develop the public procurement practices towards demand-side procurement 
(e.g. Edler & Georgiou 2007; DOC6). One concrete change would be to use 
at least a few per cent of the € 35 billion euros spent annually for public 
procurement on innovations. (IV12) 
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The government’s innovation policy is designed also to influence the public 
procurement practices to be able to move to demand-side procurement, 
taking into account the actual need in procurement. Public procurement is a 
major part of local demand and due to the difficulties present in the area 
currently, home market support is very weak for innovations in this area. 
(IV9; IV10; IV12; IV13; IV20) The improvement of public procurement 
practices should lead to improved outcomes for all the stakeholders as it 
would also improve the public infrastructure and public services in general, 
also providing supplies for the treatment of diseases that are based on the 
actual patient need (e.g. Edler & Georgiou 2007; DOC6). Towards this end, 
a wholesome change is needed in the public procurement system to enable 
such an approach. The system and all its structures should be changed to 
focus on the outcomes and long-term societal consequences instead of short-
term costs. This requires significant purchasing skills that are currently not 
present in public procurement.  
This case study should offer ground for considerations of innovation 
policies and the innovation support system from the point of view of a local 
entrant in the health care industry. Rather than offering ready solutions, the 
challenges faced by Mendor, in many cases related to the structural barriers 
of its home market, should offer food for thought for government decisions 
makers on issues related small company and innovation support in the 
health care industry.  
 “Affecting lasting change in the health care arena is more like a marathon 
than a sprint”  (Hermans & al. 2009, 58) 
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7.5. Findings – Comparison of the theoretical 
background and case study findings 
In this chapter of the study, the findings of the case study will be compared 
to the theoretical background. In chapter 5, a synthesis of the literature 
review on the barriers to entry was given. As described in the synthesis, the 
theoretical interest has mainly focused on the incumbents and on their 
strategies for deterring entry for new entrants in order to maintain their 
market position (Porter 1979; Robinson & McDougall 2001; Porter 2008; 
Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 2010) whereas the barriers to entry from an 
entrant point of view have been studied less. In order to understand the 
implications of a high regulation to barriers for de novo entry, this case 
study was used to examine a specific setting of a highly regulated health 
care industry and the barriers to entry from the perspective of a small entrant 
with an innovative offering.  
The case study in the specific industry setting produced 71 different types of 
barriers not only confirming that the types of barriers to entry vary by 
industry but also that the high regulation in the industry creates structures 
that easily lead to unfavorable conditions for new entrants. The findings also 
suggest that the barriers to entry are strongly linked to the industry but also 
to entrant specific characteristics. Furthermore, the barriers are not constant 
and stable over time but change through the interplay of the incumbent, 
entrant and government policy actions.  
Whereas earlier theory has mainly focused on the incumbents’ strategies for 
deterring entry and seen the entrant as subverting to the barriers to entry, 
this case study by focusing on the challenges that the barriers to entry create 
for the entrant, shows that the entrants can formulate strategies for tackling 
the barriers to entry to respond to the entry deterring strategies of the 
incumbents. The ways in which the company will tackle the barriers 
changes through time with a main goal of “creating a customer” (IV15; 
IV20).   
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Thus, the barriers to entry should not be seen as static and constant 
characteristics of a market but rather as dynamic conditions that are 
constantly being restructured by the incumbent and the entrant actions 
and facilitated by the government policy measures affecting the industry 
structure and conduct. 
The findings of this case study broaden the theoretical understanding of the 
barriers to entry for the de novo entrant and point out the immense 
complexity and the inter-connectedness of the challenges that the barriers to 
entry pose for the small companies. Whereas the theoretical findings suggest 
the incumbent’s strategies as the antecedent for strategic barriers to entry 
and government policy measures as the basis for the structural barriers to 
entry, the empirical findings offer a more vivid interpretation of the barriers 
to entry as changing in time and being affected also by the entrant strategies. 
In the case study, the barriers to entry are grouped according to the 
challenges and constraints that they pose for the entrant that in terms allow 
for the identification of the entrant’s potential to influence these barriers.  
Based on the theoretical findings, the only barrier that the entrant could 
influence through its actions would be overcoming the brand name barrier. 
The concept of ‘arch incumbency’ created by Fan (2010) also included a 
notion that a small entrant could improve its chances in market entry by 
focusing on small niches. In addition, earlier research has suggested that a 
very innovative entrant might be able to decrease the need for capital and be 
able to differentiate the offering in a beneficial manner (Han & al. 2001; 
Pehrsson 2009). The empirical findings suggest the strong industry 
specificity of the barriers to entry and suggest that indeed in highly 
regulated industries innovation might not always lead to favorable 
consequences but can actually increase the need for capital as the time to 
market is lengthened.  
The findings of the case study would imply that in reality the conditions for 
market entry are much more dynamic and even though the entrant can 
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hardly affect the barriers to entry, they can, after identifying the main 
challenges posed by the barriers, formulate differential strategies for gaining 
entry in response to the incumbent strategies seeking to deter entry. An 
important consideration is the industry characteristics, including the target 
customers and entrant and incumbent characteristics. The interplay between 
the three actors, the entrants, the incumbents and the governments, affects 
the barriers to entry and as such serves as the antecedent for tackling the 
barriers to entry through differential and agile strategies that can beat the 
incumbent deterrence strategies.  
The findings of the case study confirmed the important role of the 
government as the influencer of many barriers to entry, especially the 
structural barriers. An important finding from the health care industry is that 
the current structures do not serve the objective of support for birth and 
growth of new local companies and due to the bureaucratic structures 
focusing rather on specifications rather than the need, the health care 
outcomes that the current structures produce might be suboptimal too in the 
longer term. Instead of improved net social and economic welfare, the 
current structures may lead to false savings for the municipalities, decreased 
treatment outcomes for the patients and high structural barriers to entry for 
local innovation.  
As the theory suggested, the studying of barriers to entry in a regulated 
industry confirms that a regulated environment reproduces the industry 
status quo and leads to high consolidations and the favoring of the 
incumbents. The lack of competition will lead to decreased social and 
economic welfare, especially in the case of health care market where the 
industry outcomes are directly related to the social welfare of the public. A 
key finding of the case study that by taking the entrant’s perspective and 
identifying key challenges that the barriers to entry pose for the small 
entrants instead of only looking at their sources, these companies can 
formulate strategies for tackling the barriers to entry that need to change 
over time to address the key challenges of the moment. Another important 
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finding is the government can and should affect the industry outcomes by 
focusing on lowering the barriers to entry, to promote the birth and growth 
of new companies also in regulated industries. The comparative chart of the 
findings of the theoretical background and the empirical case study are 
summarized in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4 Comparison of theoretical and empirical findings on barriers to entry 
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Table 5 Comparison of theoretical and empirical findings on 'tackling' the barriers to entry 
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PART IV – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
8. Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, the thesis is concluded by synthesizing the findings. In 
addition, the academic and empirical contributions of this study and 
suggestions for further research on barriers to entry are discussed.  
8.1. Synthesis and discussion of findings 
This thesis focused on studying the topic of barriers to entry in a highly 
regulated industry from the perspective of a small entrant. A majority of the 
earlier research has focused on the incumbents and their strategies on 
creating and strengthening the barriers to entry in an industry. As such, the 
entrant perspective in this study offers a new context by studying the effects 
of barriers to entry for the entrants in a regulated industry setting. As an 
additional point of interest, the role of the government as the regulator but 
on the other hand as a supporter of new companies creation and growth is 
briefly discussed.  
The main objective of the thesis was: 
To add to the existing knowledge on the barriers to entry from the 
perspective of a de novo entrant in a specific industry setting defined by 
high regulation; to discuss the effect of regulation and high entry barriers 
on the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant and to identify what 
potential does the entrant have in tackling these barriers to entry.  
This objective was studied with the main research question: 
What are the barriers to entry for a small-scale de novo entrant entering a 
highly regulated market and how can the new entrant influence these 
barriers with limited resources to gain entry? 
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To be able to adequately answer the main research question, four additional 
sub-research questions were formulated. The first and the second research 
questions were answered through a literature review covering the existing 
research on barriers to entry. The third and fourth research questions were 
answered through the case study of Mendor Oy. The main research question 
is linked to all parts of the study and is answered through the four sub-
research questions and further clarified in section 7.5. summarizing the 
findings of this study.   
 
 
 
The first research question was studied through a literature view on the 
existing research on barriers to entry, taking into account the implications 
found on the effect of regulation in an industry, and also studying the effect 
of the size of the entrant on the theoretical barriers. 42 different types of 
barriers to entry were identified and are presented with their literature 
sources in Table 1. A categorization suggested by Karakaya (2002) was 
used as a basis for the grouping of the barriers to entry into five different 
groups including the company specific advantages, customer/market-based 
advantages, financial requirements/cost of entry, profit expectation of 
entrants, and industry characteristics.  
 
 
After the ‘what’ are the barriers to entry had been identified in the study on 
the first research question, the main objective of the second research 
question was to focus on ‘how’ the entrant could tackle the barriers to entry. 
The previous research strongly takes the incumbent perspective in the study 
RQ1: According to previous theory,  
what are the barriers to entry for a de novo entrant  
in a highly regulated industry? 
RQ2: According to previous theory, how can a de novo 
entrant tackle these barriers to entry? 
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on barriers to entry and only scant attention has been given to the entrant’s 
chances of tackling the barriers to entry. The limited research knowledge on 
the subject suggests that the entrant first has to overcome the absolute cost 
advantage of the incumbents and only then can have a chance in entering. 
The theories suggest that the entrant has very limited chance of tackling the 
barriers to entry and instead suggest that the entrant can only formulate 
strategies varying the product/market scope and product differentiation. 
Thus, the previous theory suggests that the entrant is rather helpless in terms 
of barriers to entry and in the face of the incumbents and has little chance of 
gaining market entry in industries where the barriers to entry are high.  
 
 
 
The third research question was tackled through a case study focusing on 
the market entry efforts of a small de novo entrant seeking to gain entry into 
the highly regulated health care industry. In the case study, 71 different 
types of barriers to entry were identified, offering empirical evidence to the 
theoretical models linking high levels of regulation to high barriers to entry. 
In addition, the industry specificity of the types of barriers to entry became 
evident. In regulated industries, the characteristics of all industry actors 
affect the barriers to entry and the severity of the challenges posed to new 
competition. The comparison of the theoretical and the empirical barriers to 
entry is provided in Table 4.  
 
 
 
RQ3: What are the barriers to entry for a de novo 
entrant in a highly regulated industry based on the 
empirical findings? 
RQ4: How can a small-scale de novo entrant tackle 
the barriers to entry with limited resources  
based on empirical findings? 
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To be able to study the potential for the entrant to influence i.e. ‘tackle’ the 
identified barriers to entry, a shift in the focus was needed. Whereas much 
of the previous research takes the incumbent perspective and focusing on 
the sources of the barriers to entry to give recommendations to incumbents 
on how these barriers could be created or strengthened, the current study 
focused on the challenges that the barriers to entry create for the entrant. In 
the case study focusing on the specific industry setting, four main groups of 
challenges were identified, mainly time, experience, sales and financial 
related challenges. After the identification of the challenges, the potential 
for the entrant to tackle the challenges created by the barriers to entry were 
examined. As the findings in Table 5 suggest, according to the empirical 
reality, an entrant has the potential to formulate different strategies for 
tackling the barriers to entry that change in time to answer to the barriers to 
entry posed by incumbent strategies. Thus the findings of the case study 
suggest that barriers to entry are not static but rather dynamic, changing in 
time through the incumbent and entrant strategies. As such, the findings 
suggest that the entrant can indeed through formulating successful 
strategies, tackle the barriers to entry even if it could not affect the structural 
conditions of the industry. 
 
8.2. Scientific contribution and suggestions for 
further research 
The objective of the current study was to extend the previous academic 
research on barriers to entry firstly by taking the rather understudied entrant 
perspective and secondly by examining a specific industry setting of high 
regulation to offer empirical evidence to theoretical models suggesting a 
correlation between the level of regulation and entry barriers.  
Whereas the earlier research on barriers to entry has largely ignored the 
potential for the entrant to influence the conditions for their entry (Porter 
1979; Robinson & McDougall 2001; Porter 2008; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 
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2010), this study by studying a small scale entrant seeking to enter a market 
characterized by high entry barriers, adds to the previous theoretical 
understanding on the role on the entrant in relation to barriers to entry. 
Whereas the previous research suggests that the entrant is rather powerless 
in relation to the barriers to entry (e.g. Blees & al. 2003; Cabral & Mata 
2003), the findings of this study suggest that the entrants can indeed 
formulate differential market entry strategies to respond to the entry 
deterring strategies of the incumbents. In addition, even though the earlier 
research implies that the incumbents through their strategies (Grant 1991; 
Robinson & McDougall 2001, Blees & al. 2003; Pehrsson 2009; Lutz & al. 
2010) and governments through their policy measures (Blees & al. 2003; 
Hermans & al. 2009; Friedman & Taylor 2011) create the strategic and 
structural barriers to entry, the findings of this study suggest that the barriers 
to entry are indeed affected by the interplay between the three actors – the 
entrant and incumbents strategies and government policies. Thus through 
the changing strategies of the actors, also the barriers to entry change in 
time, creating new settings for entry.  
Even though the government regulation has been acknowledged as a strong 
determinant of industry structure and conduct, and an antecedent to many 
structural barriers to entry (Blees & al. 2003; Hermans & al. 2009; 
Friedman & Taylor 2011), the phenomenon has not been studied before in a 
regulated industry setting. A body of research has modeled the link between 
regulation and high barriers to entry, assuming that a high degree of 
governmental regulation deters entry from new competition and leads to 
decreased social and economic welfare (e.g. Shaffer 1995; Blanchard & 
Giavazzi 2003; Lutz & al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 
2012; Prantl 2012) but the empirical evidence has been largely missing 
(Lutz & al. 2010). This study seeks to add empirical evidence to the effect 
of regulation on the conditions for entry. The findings of the case study 
offer empirical support for the theoretical implications that high regulation 
leads to oligopolistic structures and high barriers to entry that in turn 
decrease the competition in the market and lead to decreased economic and 
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social welfare, also severely disturbing innovation in the industry (e.g. 
Shaffer 1995; Gaynor & Haas-Wilson 1998; Bertrand & Kramarz 2002; 
Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003; Blees & al. 2003; Hermans & al. 2009; Lutz & 
al. 2010; Schivardi & Viviano 2010; Cullman & al. 2012; Prantl 2012).  
A third theoretical contribution is related to the industry specificity of the 
barriers to entry. Even though earlier research has acknowledged that the 
severity of barriers to entry varies by products and industries (Karakaya & 
Stahl 1989; Yang 1998; Karakaya 2002; Pehrsson 2009) and that the 
structural characteristics of an industry can affect the performance of a new 
entrant (Robinson & McDougall 1998; Robinson 1999; Lutz & al. 2010), 
the industry specific implications have been poorly understood due to the 
lack of empirical evidence on barriers to entry in specific industry settings. 
This study adds to the body of existing research by adding empirical 
evidence on barriers to entry present in a highly regulated industry setting 
and also examines the wide ranging effects of regulation on the number, 
severity and types of barriers to entry. The empirical findings also offer 
support for the theoretical notions of the characteristics of regulated 
industries as industries with high barriers to entry, low rates of innovation, 
and high consolidation (e.g. Friedman & Taylor 2011). 
As a summary, firstly, the previous research on barriers to entry was 
combined in the literature study to summarize the rather fragmented 
research on the subject. Secondly, by studying a specific industry setting, 
the current study suggests that the barriers to entry have high industry 
specificity and that regulated industries are likely to pose a larger amount of 
barriers to entry for de novo entrants. Thirdly, the current study identified 31 
additional industry specific barriers in the regulated industry setting thus 
implying the high contextuality of barriers to entry. Fourthly, the current 
study highlighted the relationships between regulation and barriers to entry 
and the combined effect on the incentives for innovation that are few in 
regulated industries. Lastly, the study added to the previous research on 
barriers to entry by focusing on the entrant perspective, an area of great 
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importance due to its effects on new company growth and survival but yet 
has remained understudied. Building on the entrant perspective, the current 
research criticized the previous theoretical understanding on the 
influencability of the barriers to entry and questioned the rather static 
presentation of barriers to entry in previous literature by offering a dynamic 
presentation of barriers to entry as changing in time through the 
combination of the incumbent and entrant strategies, and government 
policies.  
Based on the findings of the current study on the dynamic nature of barriers 
to entry, further research is required on the entrant and incumbent strategies 
for affecting the barriers to entry from a combined perspective. Whereas the 
previous research has largely focused on the incumbents, and whereas the 
current study adds the perspective of an entrant, a study combining the two 
perspectives is suggested to understand the combined effect on barriers to 
entry. In addition, as the barriers to entry are suggested to vary across 
different industries, further research in specific industry settings is required, 
to allow for a wholesome examination of the subject. Further research is 
also required to understand the longer term social and economic effects of 
government policy setting on new company survival across different 
industries.  
 
8.3. Recommendations for managers 
The managerial recommendations of this study base strongly on the finding 
on the dynamism of the barriers to entry. Rather than accepting the barriers 
to entry as static and as permanent structures in a given industry, a key 
finding to managers is that they can increase the chances of gaining entry by 
formulating successful strategies that should be agile in time to respond to 
the challenges posed by the industry. As a small scale de novo entrant with 
limited resources, an additional implication is to focus strongly on gathering 
industry expert knowledge into the company at the very early stages to 
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avoid making costly and time consuming mistakes. The decision on the 
market entry strategy to pursue should be based on deep market 
understanding gained from industry experts that does not necessarily have to 
be in-house but can also be gained from external consultants.  
In regulated markets, time is a key factor in relation to market entry. The 
managers of the de novo entrant company should understand this constant 
and the side effects that the slowness of the market creates. The company 
should focus on managing the stakeholder expectations from the very start 
after first gaining the market understanding it needs to make sophisticated 
forecasts on the time to market. Managers should avoid excessive naivety 
and optimism of the uniqueness and market potential of their offering and 
rather base their strategies on market data.  
Selecting the target markets becomes an important issue in terms of the 
company survival and to be able to make the right decision on which 
markets to pursue, the company should use their scant resources in deep 
market analysis focusing on a wider range of issue than simply the size of 
the market. To be able to generate the initial cash flow needed to keep the 
company alive and drive the company forward, a targeted approach with 
only a few key markets should be executed. Clearly targeting the few 
resources is likely to lead into more optimal outcomes than a shotgun 
approach with multiple moving targets.  
The case study findings show that by taking the perspective of the entrant 
and identifying the key challenges that the barriers pose rather than focusing 
on the sources of the barriers, companies can formulate competitive 
strategies to tackle these barriers. As the case study on Mendor’s market 
entry efforts described, the main consequences posed by the barriers to entry 
for the company in the specific regulated industry setting were those related 
to time, expertise, sales and financial challenges. The identification of these 
challenges has allowed the company to formulate strategies that have 
allowed them to overcome these deficiencies through partnering and 
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competitive strategies and offers an improved focus for its resources into 
solving the challenges related to entry. A key finding continues to be that 
not all markets should be pursued at once but the company should find and 
target key markets based on a deep market analysis where it will have the 
possibility to generate sales when constrained by limited resources. The key 
recommendations are listed in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13 Key managerial recommendations 
 
8.4. Implications for policy makers  
The recommendations for policy makers are based on the multiple role of 
the government in a regulated industry. On one hand, it acts as a regulator, 
creating many structural barriers to entry. On the other hand, the 
government and its organizations have a role in supporting new company 
birth and growth in the economy that in turn would add to the net social and 
economic welfare through the paid taxes and employment created. In the 
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specific setting of the health care industry, the government is also a 
customer with a major effect on the demand conditions in the industry. 
As the case study showed, the current regulatory environment and especially 
the practices that have been interpreted from the regulations pose very 
difficult challenges for small companies in the health care industry. The 
current environment reproduces the industry status quo, leading to high 
consolidation and the favoring of the incumbents. As discussed in the 
section 3.1. covering the relationship between regulation of entry and the 
social consequences, the consolidation of the industry and other detrimental 
side effects of high barriers to entry rarely lead to increased social or 
economic welfare. In addition, as described in section 3.3. on the 
relationship between regulation and innovation, high entry barriers created 
by regulation are ‘killers’ for innovation and as also confirmed in the case 
study, often make a market impossible to compete in for new entrants, 
forcing the companies to focus on other markets, as has been the case for 
Mendor in its home market of Finland. 
The longer term industry effects and also the wider social and economic 
welfare implications should be considered when setting new policies or 
regulations. Also, a critical eye should be addressed to the potential 
wrongful interpretations of the regulations and the practices that will follow 
from these interpretations. The current state of public procurement is a 
model example of practices derived from regulations that due to multiple of 
issues have in time develop to only serve the short term financial concerns 
of municipalities instead of focusing on the social and economic welfare 
consequences in the longer term.  
As a key driver of home market demand, the public procurement is 
excluding innovations, even local ones, making it very difficult for local 
companies to gain home market references that they need in international 
market entry. In addition, many companies end up dying before reaching 
sufficient growth due to the slowness of the market in an environment that 
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does not offer sufficient support for companies’ market entry efforts in the 
lack of financing for market entry or support through local demand.  
The implications for policy makers are clear. In order to support new 
company birth and growth, especially in industries that have a wider social 
consequences such as health care, the government structures should allow at 
least a fraction of the public demand to be used to support local innovations 
as a key driver of local demand. This would allow for the companies to 
create the much needed home market references but also add to increased 
public welfare through the support for local economy and local companies. 
In addition, the role of the Finnish innovation support system and the 
responsibilities of its actors should be streamlined to be able to offer new 
companies the support they need also after the R&D phase, ensuring 
adequate funding to make up for the lack of private funding in Finland.  
 
8.5. Reliability and validity of the study 
In this last section of the study, the realized reliability and validity of the 
study are assessed. The means executed in this study for ensuring the 
reliability and the validity are discussed in section 5.3.  
As described in section 5.3., the data collection was planned carefully in 
advance and the case study protocol was designed based on a research plan, 
the literature review and interview structures. In addition, a study database 
was used for storing all the interview transcriptions, document and article 
references during the execution of this study. Thus, the reliability of the 
study can be assessed as good.  
The construct validity was improved by ensuring the use of multiple sources 
of data, both internal to the case company but also external informed 
sources. The interviews within the case company covered individuals from 
all the company functions and the external interviews included discussions 
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with individuals from several different support system actors. In addition, 
the case protocol was followed and a case database was used. Lastly, the 
findings of the study were reviewed with key informants as a third wave of 
interviews towards the end of the study period. Thus also the construct 
validity can be evaluated as good.  
Due to the case study specificity focusing on a single case study in a single 
industry setting, the scope of the study is restricted to one case company. 
This can limit the generalizability of the findings and the recommendations 
to only very similar companies as the case company. Thus the assessment of 
the external validity is rather low. However, as the key findings and the 
recommendations focus on the nature of barriers to entry and the chances 
for the entrant to influence these barriers without offering specific means 
but rather food for thought for companies seeking to enter a market with 
high barriers to entry, the study does provide implications to small 
companies across a wider range of settings. In addition, the findings of the 
literature review add to the general knowledge on barriers to entry. Careful 
documentation of the data collection procedure and the collected literature 
sources ensure the easy and accurate replication of the study. In addition, 
the general rather than specific recommendations offer ready frameworks 
for the testing of the study in other industry settings as well.  
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IV1 Mr. 
K.R. 
Mendor 16.5.2012 
13:00 
Preliminary planning of the 
study, Mendor strategy, 
company history 
Informal 
discussion 
IV2 Mr. 
H.U. 
Mendor 17.5.2012 
12:00 
Preliminary planning of the 
study 
Informal 
discussion 
IV3 Mr. 
P.M. 
Mendor 21.5.2012 
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Preliminary planning of the 
study, industry description 
Informal 
discussion 
      
IV4 Mr. 
K.K. 
VTT 19.6.2012 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV5 Mr. 
J.L. 
VTT 20.6.2012 
13:00 
R&D in a regulated industry Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV6 Mr. 
J.J. 
Keksintösäätiö 26.6.2012 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry 
Semi-
structured 
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J.T. 
Tekes 27.6.2012 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry, TEKES role in 
support system 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
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H.L. 
Tekes 27.6.2012 
10:00 
Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry, TEKES role in 
support system 
Semi-
structured 
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L.P. 
Finpro, Operations  
and Network 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry 
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structured 
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Barriers to entry created by 
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Semi-
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K.V. 
Työ- ja 
elinkeinoministeriö / 
Elinkeino- ja innovaatio-
2.7.2012 
14:00 
Public procurement and 
government innovation policy 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
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Barriers to entry for Mendor 
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FiHTA/ 
Teknologiateollisuus 
4.7.2012 
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Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry 
Semi-
structured 
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IV15 Mr. 
K.R. 
Mendor 4.7.2012 
14:00 
Tackling barriers to entry in 
Mendor 
Discussion 
IV16 Mr. 
P.M. 
Mendor 5.7.2012 
14:00 
Barriers to entry and tackling 
barriers to entry for Mendor 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV17 Mr. 
T.M. 
Spinno 23.7.2012 
10:00 
Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry and role of 
incubators 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV18 Mr. 
M.Y. 
Mendor 23.7.2012 
12:00 
Barriers to entry and tackling 
barriers to entry for Mendor 
Discussion 
IV19 Mr. 
H.U. 
Mendor 10.8.2012 
10:30 
Barriers to entry and tackling 
barriers to entry for Mendor 
Discussion 
IV20 Mr. 
O.R. 
Mendor 21.8.2012 
10:00 
Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry and tackling the 
barriers 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV21 Mrs. 
M.K. 
Mendor 5.9.2012 
10:00 
Barriers to entry and tackling 
barriers to entry for Mendor 
Discussion 
IV22 Mr. 
M.J. 
Mendor 11.9.2012 
10:00 
Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry and tackling the 
barriers - role of regulation 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
IV23 Mr. 
A.V. 
Mendor 20.9.2012 
11:00 
Barriers to entry and tackling 
barriers to entry for Mendor 
Discussion 
IV24 Mrs. 
N.V. 
Mendor 20.9.2012 
16:00 
Barriers to entry in medical 
device industry and tackling the 
barriers - role of regulation 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
      
IV25 Mr. 
K.R. 
Mendor 4.10.2012 
17:00 
Preliminary study structure 
and findings 
Informal 
discussion 
IV26 Mr. 
P.M. 
Mendor 8.10.2012 
16:00 
Preliminary study structure 
and findings 
Informal 
discussion 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Djankov et al. 
(2002) 
1. Screening Procedures 
• Certify business competence 
• Certify a clean criminal record  
• Certify marital status 
• Check the name for uniqueness 
• Notarize company deeds 
• Notarize registration certificate  
• File with the Statistical Bureau 
• File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of the Economy, or the 
respective ministries by line of business 
• Notify municipality of start-up date  
• Obtain certificate of compliance with the company law 
• Obtain business license (operations permit) 
• Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business) 
• Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital 
• Perform an official audit at start-up 
• Publish notice of company foundation 
• Register at the Companies Registry 
• Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry  
      or the Regional Trade Association 
2. Tax-related requirements 
• Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employees' income tax  from the company 
payroll funds 
• Designate a bondsman for tax purposes 
• File with the Ministry of Finance 
• Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities 
• Register for corporate income tax 
• Register for VAT 
• Register for state taxes 
• Register the company by laws with the Tax Authorities 
• Seal, validate, rubricate accounting books 
3. Labor/social security related requirements 
• File with the Ministry of Labor 
• Issue employment declarations for all employees 
• Notarize the labor contract 
• Pass inspections by social security officials 
• Register for accident and labor risk insurance 
• Register for health and medical insurance 
• Register with pension funds 
• Register for Social Security 
• Register for unemployment insurance 
• Register with the housing fund 
4. Safety and health requirements 
• Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from 
the Health Ministry 
• Pass inspections and obtain certificates related to work safety, building, fire, 
sanitation, and hygiene 
5. Environment-related requirements 
• Issue environmental declaration 
• Obtain environment certificate 
• Obtain sewer approval 
• Obtain zoning approval 
• Pass inspections from environmental officials 
• Register with the water management and water discharge authorities 
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Appendix 2 
Case company identified barriers to entry with interview references 
Company specific barriers  
Absolute cost advantage IV13; IV18 
Availability of information IV16; IV18; IV22 
Control over systems and integration IV4; IV5; IV13 
Credibility IV6; IV18; IV19 
Economies of scale IV13; IV18 
Entrant resources IV9; IV16; IV18; IV19; IV23  
Exclusive deals with customers  IV13; IV21; IV23 
Government subsidies IV13; IV14; IV16 
Incumbent control over strategic resources  IV4; IV13; IV16; IV18 
Incumbent resources IV16; IV18; IV20 
Incumbents with proprietary technology / level of technology IV4; IV9; IV12; IV13; IV23 
Level of expertise and competence IV2; IV4; IV9; IV16; IV18 
Lobbying IV4; IV6; IV7; IV9; IV12; IV22; IV23; 
IV24 
Political resources/relations IV7; IV9; IV23 
References IV9; IV12; IV19; IV20 
Relationships / other bonds with different stakeholders IV6; IV21; IV23 
Strategy / direction IV1; IV7; IV3; IV18; IV19 
  
Customer/market-based barriers  
Bundling of offerings IV9 
Conservatism and bureaucracy in processes IV1; IV6; IV9; IV12; IV20; IV21 
Customer pricing pressures IV3; IV13 
De-centralization of decision makers IV4; IV14; IV21 
High bargaining power of buyers IV1; IV16; IV23 
High customer switching costs IV3; IV4 
High risk involved in purchase IV12; IV23 
Immense risk aversion IV1; IV6; IV9; IV12; IV14; IV23 
Level of expertise/knowledge IV8; IV9; IV12; IV14; IV21; IV23 
Multiple stakeholders with different motives involved in 
purchase 
IV4; IV14; IV23 
Product differentiation IV3 
Resistance to change IV5; IV9; IV21 
Strong brands building trust IV3 
Strong customer loyalty  IV16; IV23 
  
Financial requirements / cost of entry  
Capital intensity of the market and investment risk IV1; IV2; IV8 
Capital requirements  IV1; IV2; IV16; IV18 
Costs of operating in foreign markets IV13; IV19 
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Cultural distance IV7; IV9 
High transaction costs IV13; IV19 
High wages for skilled employees IV16; IV18 
Marketing intensity IV3 
R&D expense involved in entering / R&D intensity IV2; IV18 
Regulatory requirements IV1; IV22 
Risks of innovating IV13; IV16 
Sales intensity IV3; IV17; IV18; IV19 
Sunk costs  IV16 
Uncertainty of entry IV1; IV2; IV16; IV20 
  
Profit expectation of entrants  
Access to distribution channels IV4; IV9; IV13 
Average product lifecycle IV13; IV16; IV18 
Differing expectations of stakeholders IV4; IV6; IV7; IV9; IV13; IV18; IV19; 
IV20; IV23 
Excess capacity IV18 
Expected retaliation by incumbents IV13; IV16 
High profit rates earned by incumbents IV13; IV16 
Incumbent control over pricing IV16 
Low rate of technology change IV18 
Market growth IV3 
Market knowledge IV3; IV18 
Range of products available IV3 
Reimbursement systems IV16 
  
Industry characteristics  
Asset specificity IV2; IV18 
Availability of financing IV1; IV2; IV5; IV8; IV9; IV17 
Availability of skilled labor IV18; IV19 
Different purchasing infrastructures IV3; IV18 
Horizontal integration IV16; IV19 
Government policies IV16; IV22; IV23 
Location IV8; IV9; IV19 
Patents IV4; IV6; IV12; IV24 
Public procurement IV1; IV6; IV9; IV12; IV20; IV21 
Restrictions on promotion IV16 
Seller concentration IV4; IV13; IV16; IV19 
Size of incumbents IV1; IV3; IV18 
Stakeholders' time IV1; IV2; IV3; IV9; IV17; IV18; IV21 
Standardization IV22; IV23; IV24 
Vertical integration IV16 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
A typical development chain and funding of medical innovations  
(Adapted from Hermans & al. 2009) 
 
